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Abstract  
This working paper examines the development of regional socioeconomic scenarios for West 
Africa’s development, agriculture, food security and climate impacts. We present four 
globally consistent regional scenarios framed and outlined by regional experts who crafted 
narratives and determined key drivers of change. Stakeholders identified the type of actors 
driving change and the timeline of strategic planning as the most uncertain and most relevant 
factors of change affecting food security, livelihoods and environments in the region. 
The scenarios were linked to the IPCC community’s global Shared Socio-economic Pathways 
(SSPs) and quantified using two agricultural economic models, GLOBIOM and IMPACT, in 
interaction with drivers outlined by the SSPs and guided by semi-quantitative information 
from the stakeholders. The quantification of the scenarios has provided additional insights 
into the possible development of Western Africa in the context of a global economy as well as 
how the agricultural sector may be affected by climate change. The scenarios process 
highlights the need to combine socio-economic and climate scenarios, to base these scenarios 
in regional expertise, and ways to make scenarios useful for policy design. 
The objective of this working paper is to provide scenarios for future regional development 
for West Africa on the future of food security, environment, and rural livelihoods as well as 
offer details of the multi-stakeholder scenarios development process. Using both qualitative 
and quantitative scenarios we provide insights into the possible development of West Africa 
as well as a scalable framework for regional decision makers and the scientific community to 
use scenarios to build and test policies to make them more robust in the face of future 
uncertainty.  
In these scenarios, strong economic development increases food security and agricultural 
development. Increased crop and livestock productivity may lead to an expansion of 
agricultural areas within the region but productivity improvements may reduce the pressure 
on land elsewhere. In the context of a global economy, West Africa remains a large consumer 
and producer of a selection of commodities. However, the growth in population in 
combination with rising incomes may lead to increases in the region’s imports. For West 
Africa, climate change is likely to have negative effects on both crop yields and grassland 
productivity, and lack of investment in agriculture may exacerbate them. 
The aim of the regional scenarios is provide challenging contexts for policy makers to test and 
develop a range of national and regional policies. To date, the scenarios have been used in a 
number of policy design processes which include collaborations with ECOWAS priority 
setting, the National Plan for the Rural Sector for Burkina Faso (PNSR), and district and 
national level policy processes in Ghana.  
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Introduction 
Researchers, policy makers, entrepreneurs and development practitioners working to improve 
food security, environmental health and rural livelihoods in the developing world face many 
uncertainties when exploring the future of food systems (Ericksen et al. 2009). It is difficult 
to predict what economic, political and social conditions will be like in the next few years 
and virtually impossible to predict the medium to longer term (van Vuuren et al. 2012). 
Climate change and variability are among the greatest unknowns, and are likely to have far-
reaching effects on food security, environments and livelihoods (Vermeulen et al. 2012).  
This working paper presents four alternative plausible futures, or scenarios, for food security, 
environments and livelihoods in West Africa. The scenarios are based on different 
assumptions and pathways of socio-economic and political development. They were 
developed under the auspices of CGIAR's Research Programme 7: Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). A number of workshops, attended by stakeholders, 
drawn from governments, civil society, the research community and the media, fed into the 
development process. The scenarios describe trends and events since 2010 up to 2050. These 
scenarios were translated to semi-quantitative assessments of a range of drivers and indicators 
and quantified with two agricultural economic models, IMPACT (Robinson et al., 2015), 
developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and GLOBIOM 
(Havlik et al., 2014) developed by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA). The separate presentation of the semi-quantitative and quantitative results in this 
report allows the stories to flow and also makes it easier for the reader to compare data 
between the different scenarios.  
The aim of the scenarios process has been to provide alternate, plausible, relevant and 
challenging futures in narratives and numbers that can be used by policymakers, the private 
sector, civil society leaders and development researchers to test ideas about the future and the 
strategies, technologies and research recommendations needed to deal with the future 
successfully. Specifically, the scenarios can guide policy prioritization, frame research 
questions and help agenda setting in the drive towards improved food security, environmental 
management and rural livelihoods in the face of climate change in Western Africa. The West 
Africa scenarios have been used in several policy development projects, including the 
revision of the National Program for the Rural Sector in Burkina Faso and the development 
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of multi-level integrated adaptation plans in Ghana. Both are described in Chapter 3 in 
greater detail.  
The first part of this working paper introduces the CCAFS programme, then outlines why 
scenarios are valuable as a planning tool, and then presents the narratives and semi-
quantitative indicators developed by workshop participants. Part 2 of the working paper will 
present quantitative results that also integrate the socio-economic scenarios with climate 
scenarios.  
The CGIAR Research Programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security (CCAFS) 
Climate change is recognised as one of the most pressing threats to food security and 
wellbeing. It has consequently emerged as a major political issue worldwide. Many advocate 
the urgent need to design and implement policies that would allow populations to adapt and 
develop resilience to the impacts of climate change. Also, the challenge of mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions remains a key priority. Importantly, for actors across sectors and at 
different system levels, climate change is one of a number of biophysical, socio-economic 
and political stressors, as it affects hundreds of millions of people who depend on small-scale 
agriculture for their livelihoods. Climate change affects agriculture and food security, and 
likewise, agriculture and natural resource management affect the climate system. These 
complex and dynamic relationships are also shaped by economic policies, political conflict 
and other factors such as the spread of infectious diseases. In order to develop practical 
solutions for agriculture in the face of climate change, we need to integrate knowledge about 
climate change, agriculture, and food security in a meaningful and innovative way.  
The Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security Program (CCAFS) is a major research 
partnership between CGIAR and the global environmental change community. As global 
climate change is comprised of myriad critically important and complex issues that require 
thorough inter- and transdisciplinary research and knowledge, these issues are addressed 
through a strategic collaboration between CCAFS and Future Earth, a major international 
research platform providing the knowledge and support to accelerate our transformations to a 
sustainable world. Its overall goal is to promote a food secure world through the provision of 
science-based efforts that support sustainable agriculture and enhance livelihood while 
adapting to climate change and conserving natural resources and environmental services. To 
achieve this goal, two main objectives has been defined: a) to identify and develop pro-poor 
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adaptation and mitigation practices, technologies and policies for food systems, adaptive 
capacity and rural livelihoods, and b) to provide diagnosis and analysis that will ensure the 
inclusion of agriculture in climate change policies and the inclusion of climate issues in 
agricultural policies from the sub-national to the global level in a way that bring benefits to 
the rural poor. 
The program covers five regions worldwide namely South Asia, East Africa, West Africa, 
Latin America and South East Asia. Major activities in West Africa are pertaining to 
research, engagement, capacity strengthening and communication and have been initiated 
with various partners at community, national and regional levels. This covered components 
such as (1) testing of adaptation and mitigation practices and technologies through 
participatory action research at sites in five pilot countries; (2) Capacity strengthening of 
partners on research approaches, scientific tools, M&E, knowledge and information 
management and sharing; (3) Decision making support for policy makers; and (4) 
Communication and outreach. Gender and social differentiation are mainstreamed across 
these activities. 
What are scenarios and why are they useful?  
The development and use of scenarios originates in the military and in the private sector. 
Scenarios are ‘what if’ stories about the future, told in words, numbers (models), images, 
and other means. Rather than attempting to forecast a single future in the face of broad 
future uncertainty, scenarios represent multiple plausible directions that future drivers of 
change may take (Figure 1). The CCAFS scenarios process focuses on contextual drivers of 
change for agriculture, livelihoods, environments and food security – climate change and 
socio-economic changes (e.g. in markets, governance, broad economic developments, 
infrastructure).  
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Figure 1  Rather than providing a single “most likely” forecast, multiple scenarios explore multiple 
concrete, plausible futures and what these would mean for food security, environments and 
livelihoods. This way, the set of scenarios engages with broad future uncertainty for the testing of 
policies, investments and research innovations. 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Within the CCAFS program, scenarios are used to test and develop policies, plans and 
investments. Each scenario offers different future challenges and opportunities. Therefore, 
for each scenario, planners can ask the question: how well will our plan work under the 
specific conditions of this scenario? What needs to be changed? When recommendations 
for improvement from a range of different scenarios are integrated, the plan has a better 
chance of being effective in the face of an uncertain future – for instance by having 
strategies that are expected to work under all scenarios, or by including a range of different 
options that can be used depending on the specific scenario. Scenarios can also be used 
before a plan exists, by starting with the challenges and opportunities that different 
scenarios offer, coming up with ways to approach those issues, and then combining them in 
a new, robust, plan.  
Both approaches are summarized in Figure 2.  
  
Future: broad 
uncertainty
Forecasting:
Single future
Past
Present 
perspective
Future: broad 
uncertainty
Multiple scenarios
Past
Present 
perspective
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Figure 2  Using scenarios to develop and test plans and policies in different stages 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Scenarios in the CGIAR Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security 
programme 
CCAFS is coordinating regional scenario development and application in East Africa, West 
Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central America and the Andean region (Palazzo et al. 
2014). In each region it is working with stakeholders from the policy, private, media and 
research sectors as well as non-government and civil society organizations. The scenarios 
build on previous work done by the CCAFS team and its Scenarios Advisory Group, in 
particular the multi-level scenarios work conducted as part of the Millennium Ecosystems 
Assessment (2005). 
The CCAFS regional scenarios process plays a unique role in the context of food security, 
environments and livelihoods. It helps to articulate the challenges presented by climate 
change by introducing a complementary focus on socio-economic and governance change. At 
the same time, by adopting a regional rather than a purely national stance, the scenarios 
process links different scales and integrates the needs of a wide range of stakeholders, 
thereby identifying potential synergies and trade-offs (Ericksen et al. 2009). A cross-level, 
cross-sector approach of this kind that focuses on exploring different futures with 
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partnerships across food systems has seldom been attempted previously (Zurek & Henrichs 
2007). The CCAFS scenarios are specifically developed to guide policy development.  
The CCAFS West Africa scenarios and their development 
The CGIAR programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) has 
collaborated with a wide range of actors (see Appendix A) in West Africa to develop socio-
economic scenarios for the ECOWAS region, with a particular focus on Burkina Faso, 
Senegal, Niger, Ghana and Mali. Four workshops were organized to this end in the period 
from 2010 to 2012. 
Regional stakeholders outlined four scenarios, structured along two axes of uncertainty, using 
narrative flowcharts, conceptual maps, storylines, and a range of semi-quantitative indicators 
including information on governance, agriculture, food security and livelihoods. For 
stakeholders, the actors driving change in the region (state and non-state actors) and the time 
priority of policies (short-term and long-term) were the most uncertain but relevant factors 
for agriculture and food security in the future, represented in Figure 4. Figure 5 depicts a 
cartoon representation (by André Daniel Tapsoba) of the scenarios resulting these two key 
drivers of change. Climate change is considered to be a major factor of policy challenges; but 
this factor is brought into the scenarios through climate models (see next section).  
Some key points to consider while using this set of scenarios:  
 The distinction ‘short-term versus long-term’ relates to the prevailing paradigm in 
each scenario, along the entire scenario time line (up to 2050). This means that at any 
one point in the scenario, whether it is in the next five years or in 2030, short-term 
concerns are prioritized by actors in the scenario. For instance, dealing with conflicts, 
immediate poverty crises, short-term profits etc. will be considered a priority and 
long-term concerns like investments in infrastructure, long-term climate impacts, 
education etc. are not as high on the strategic agenda. The two scenarios that have this 
feature therefore go through cycles of dealing with short-term crises and short-term 
investments. The opposite is true for the scenarios where long-term priorities get a 
higher standing. The division between short term/long term is not meant as a 
good/bad division; obviously many pressing problems and opportunities are of a 
short-term nature and need attention.  
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 The scenarios are to be used as a set to test and develop policies – each scenario 
highlights and amplifies certain challenges and opportunities associated with a 
situation on one end of the extreme of the two scenario axes. The policy reality might 
be some mix of these scenarios; but by pulling them apart, plans and policies can be 
tested under a set of extreme conditions, and the plans’ strengths and weaknesses can 
be assessed and improved with regard to these extreme stories.  
 In each scenario, two trends are dominant, but this does not mean other trends are not 
there, merely that these trends are weaker.  
Figure 3  Participants in Dakar, Senegal developing scenario narratives 
  
Source: Authors 
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Figure 4  Four socio-economic scenarios have been developed by stakeholders in West Africa, 
structured around two axes of uncertainty: a) will short-term priorities or long-term priorities be 
the focus of governance and b) will state actors or non-state actors be the driving force in the 
region? 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Figure 5  Cartoon representation of the scenarios, by artist André Daniel Tapsoba
 
Source: Authors 
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Quantifying the scenarios  
Modelling tools have been used to add rigour to the qualitative storylines, since they provide 
the quantitative data needed to ensure the suggested outcomes and indicators are credible, and 
to combine the socio-economic scenarios with various climate scenarios. The teams used 
IFPRI’s IMPACT model (Rosegrant et al. 1995) and IIASA’s GLOBIOM model (Havlík et 
al. 2011). These are both ‘partial equilibrium’ models, meaning, in this case, that they 
simulate global market dynamics for agricultural products only, not for entire economies. 
Both models have strengths and weaknesses. IMPACT has a long history of being used to 
examine alternative futures for global food supply, demand, trade and prices, while 
GLOBIOM is designed with detailed grid-cell information and follows a bottom-up approach 
to provide policy advice on global issues concerning competition for land among major 
production sectors. While IMPACT and GLOBIOM are global models, as part of the CCAFS 
exercise they are being modified to allow simulation for specific regions. Both models will be 
described in more detail in section 6 “GLOBIOM and IMPACT”. 
Quantification has several benefits. Illustrating the narratives with numbers gives prospective 
users more definite information that can be applied in the testing of policies and research 
recommendations. In addition, the models represent a structured set of assumptions that can 
be used to challenge the ideas proposed by the narratives and to make each narrative more 
internally consistent. In an iterative process, the regional stakeholders challenged the 
modelling results if they thought these were not plausible from a regional perspective. 
Furthermore, the scenarios created by the regional stakeholders ask questions about the future 
that might challenge the model designers to adapt their models, creating a two-way 
interaction between the narratives and the modelling results for further improvement of the 
scenarios. 
A socio-economic scenario can be combined with multiple climate scenarios and vice versa. 
Because of this, a socio-economic scenario that offers few opportunities for adaptation (for 
instance because of low investment in infrastructure and low government support of rural 
communities) will play out very differently under a low climate change scenario than under a 
high climate change scenario. Socio-economic scenarios are combined with climate 
scenarios, in a process similar to that used by the IPCC-related global environmental change 
community (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6  The IPPC-related global environmental change research community generates global socio-
economic scenarios or “shared socio-economic pathways” and combines these with different 
climate scenarios or “representative concentration pathways with different climate forcing levels. 
The CCAFS scenarios process in West Africa also combines socio-economic and climate scenarios 
using this approach, but at the regional level. 
 
 
Using scenarios for policy planning and investment 
guidance 
The combined socio-economic and climate scenarios for West Africa are used to guide 
policy, investment and research in several ways: 
1. Organize strategic planning at the sub-continental level in West Africa: the CCAFS 
West Africa scenarios can be used to bring decision-makers across the region together 
to exchange knowledge and connect activities for strategic agricultural, adaptation 
and mitigation policies. ECOWAS plays the key role at the regional level, both 
through its own regional policies (e.g. ECOWAP, Action Program for Reducing 
Vulnerability to Climate Change in West Africa) and its convening power in bringing 
regional decision-makers together for this purpose.  
2. Guide and develop agricultural, environmental, adaptation and mitigation policies at 
the national level in West Africa: scenarios can test whether policies are able to deal 
with future climatic and socio-economic changes, and help think about more strategic 
and flexible policies. Examples are the revision of the National Program for the Rural 
Sector in Burkina Faso and policy review with the Ghana CCAFS national policy 
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platform. Figure 7 illustrates how multiple scenarios offer different challenges and 
opportunities for policies and plans. 
3. Guide investments into agriculture, food security and environments: scenarios provide 
a decision context to determine which investments by donors and social entrepreneurs 
are likely to be successful under a wide range of future contexts. CCAFS is currently 
working on Climate-Smart Agriculture investments in Southern Africa and South East 
Asia with FAO using scenarios methodology. 
4. Provide a context for research: work on adaptation and mitigation measures such as 
new crop varieties or management strategies can be tested against multiple climate 
and socio-economic scenarios for feasibility 
5. Provide a regional context for local decision-making: the scenarios offer a regional 
context (prices, governance, infrastructure, land use change, etc.) for local and sub-
national level decision-making processes.  
Figure 7  Multiple scenarios each offer different challenges to a given policy (say, national 
adaptation plans) over different time steps. Two examples of combined climate and socio-economic 
scenarios are used.  
 
 
 
From the perspective of the above goals, two features of the scenarios process are important 
benefits:  
 Key to this process is that policy and investment guidance using the scenarios will be 
done in a highly participatory fashion in which the decision-makers and investors 
themselves create ownership with the scenarios and use them to renegotiate plans and 
priorities, rather than CCAFS coming in as outside experts. Therefore, proposals for 
Scenario combination 1a:  high climate impacts, private 
sector dominant, regional focus on short-term priorities 
Scenario combination 2b:  medium climate impacts, 
governments dominant, regional focus on long-term priorities
2030 2050
2030 2050
Medium-term plans 2020 Long-term vision 2050
Adaptation policy
2020
2020
Challenges Opportunities
ChallengesOpportunities
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investment and policy change will come from the relevant decision-makers and 
investments themselves and have a high likelihood of being implemented, especially 
because CCAFS will help with the facilitation of these changes.  
 The proposals that decision makers and investors generate will provide specific 
engagement points for research by CCAFS and its partners in the sub-region to 
provide scientific support and recommend innovations and adaptation options. This 
happens in a demand-driven fashion based on the priorities identified by decision-
makers and investors through the scenarios process.  
Using the CCAFS West Africa scenarios 
In several projects, the CCAFS West Africa scenarios have been put to use. Two examples 
are described in this section: The scenarios were utilized in a multi-level policy development 
process focused on climate adaptation in Ghana, as well as the scenario-guided review 
process of the National Program for the Rural Sector in Burkina Faso.  
In Ghana, a project called Multi-level Integrated Adaptation Governance (MIAG) was 
initiated in 2014 as part of the CCAFS Systemic Integrated Adaptation (SIA) Program. 
Taking a multi-level approach, this project’s objective was to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of climate adaptation efforts in Ghana. Actors from the national, regional, 
district and village level were invited to a workshop in Accra, Ghana that took place in April 
2014. During this workshop they developed adaptation plans for all of these levels. The next 
step was to downscale of the CCAFS West Africa to fit the contexts the respective levels. 
Subsequently, these downscaled scenarios were used to review the plans, by facilitating an 
understanding of the factors that may pose challenges to local development such as 
population growth, urbanization, and government policies, and thereby providing 
recommendations to make them more robust (Helfgott et al., 2014). 
In Burkina Faso, several centers of the CGIAR group (CIFOR1, ICRAF2, ICRISAT3, IWMI4 
and ILRI5) implement research under the following CRPs: Forests, Trees and Agroforestry 
 
 
1 Center for International Forestry Research 
2 World Agroforestry Center 
3 International Crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics 
4 International Water Management Institute 
5 International Livestock Research Institute 
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(FTA), Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security 
(CCAFS) and Dryland Systems.  
Since 2013, these CRPs undertook a joint initiative to tackle the twin challenges to more 
effectively coordinate their interventions in Burkina Faso and to demonstrate the contribution 
of their research to the development goals set by the Government of Burkina Faso for the 
rural sector.  
As a part of this project, a workshop was organized focusing on the revision of the National 
Program for the Rural Sector, or Programme National du Secteur Rural (PNSR) in French. 
This workshop took place in July 2015, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The workshop 
participants were representatives of the government, CGIAR research centers, civil society 
organisations and the (rural) private sector. The workshop process was aimed at examining 
the policy in the context of multiple socio-economic and climate scenarios (downscaled 
versions of the CCAFS West Africa scenarios), to improve the policy’s robustness, flexibility 
and feasibility in the face of these diverse futures. In addition, the joint initiative of the CRPs 
FTA, CCAFS, WLE and Dryland Systems was linked to this process: workshop participants 
identified how CGIAR research can contribute to strengthening the PNSR. This scenario-
guided policy development process is unique as it brings together CGIAR experts and 
national policy making experts, and links policy formulation directly to research (Rutting et 
al., 2015). 
Scenarios 
In the following section we present a summary of the four plausible scenarios for the future 
socioeconomic development of Western Africa. The four scenarios are derived from two key 
uncertainties in the region, the actors driving change within the region (state and non-state 
actors) and the time priority of policies (short-term and long-term). In Appendix B, the longer 
narratives are presented.  
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Cash, Control & Calories 
A scenario about short-term priorities with state actors as the dominant force in West Africa 
to 2050 
Figure 8  Cash, Control & Calories 
 
 
Summary: 
This scenario sees governments playing a strong role in governing West Africa’s food 
security and livelihoods, following from an ultimately successful intervention of regional 
militaries to stabilize Mali in the 2010s. However, short-termism drives government policies. 
Governments are more focused on urban social stability and security than rural lives. Quick 
fixes and fast gains and cash get priority. Quantity is emphasized before quality. The 
disregard of rural food security eventually leads to increases in the need for food aid and 
external safety nets such as urban to rural cash flows. Governments become very adept at 
mobilizing foreign aid money. Commercial, monoculture agriculture is implemented widely 
leading to environmental degradation and conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists. 
Resource mining for quick food production has destructive long-term effects. Regional 
integration plans do not last, and the lack of regional policies means that water conflicts occur 
regularly. On the other hand, vigorous efforts are made to follow the Millennium 
Development Goals through mass education and decentralization of power.  
  15 
 
  
Mali, an unfolding example of state-led C3 prioritization? 
 
Mali, marked by conflict in the 2010s, provides a characteristic example of the “Cash, Control, 
Calories” direction that West Africa has taken:  
 A trigger event (Libya) led to a democracy growth crisis 
 Initially, there is vigorous effort at reaching Millennium Development Goals: mass 
education, decentralization – but these efforts clash with security concerns. 
 Mali eventually develops enhanced capacity to attract funding to improve food 
security and energy supply, arguing for a “Marshall Plan for West Africa”. 
 But there is a lack of consistent long-term visioning & strategy in some key secular 
areas (such as education and security). 
 The quality of education & management capacity remains reduced. 
 There are growing (social, geographical) inequities in access to resources. 
 Social tension and conflicts contribute to macro-level vulnerability. 
 Food aid is needed to support vulnerable communities who are suffering from a 
domino effect of delayed development and sub-par crop yields. 
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Self-determination 
A scenario where state actors are dominant and long-term priorities prevail in West Africa 
up to 2050 
Figure 9  Self-Determination 
 
Summary: 
This scenario explores a future that is characterized by a slow, difficult, uncertain and often 
painful transition to sustainable governance of food security, environments and livelihoods. 
Governments, emerging out of a period of uncertainty to relative stability and a successfully 
moderated regional military intervention in Mali, drive the change through regional 
collaboration, better tools for effective government and a focus on and longer-term 
investment into infrastructure and access to markets for rural populations, education and 
direct investments into agriculture. All of this has to be done on a small budget because donor 
funds have declined after the region’s drive to Self-Determination has resulted in 
international disputes about outside influence. By 2030, a measure of regional food self-
sufficiency has been achieved by West African countries. However, agricultural 
intensification has a negative impact on rural employment. Also, increased agricultural 
productivity and extended land use have impacts on water availability and quality which 
produces challenges for the region’s developments 
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Civil Society to the Rescue? 
A scenario where non-state actors are dominant and long-term issues have priority. 
Figure 10  Civil Society at the Rescue? 
 
Summary:  
This is a scenario where active private sector interests aiming for the large-scale commercial 
development of West Africa vie for influence with vibrant and powerful civil society 
organizations and NGOs who focus on a more community-oriented, sustainable future. Civil 
society in West Africa had first realised its strength by successfully leveraging its global 
partners to help ensure that extra-regional military interventions in Mali would be 
humanitarian rather than destructive. This powerful civil society and the private sector 
collaborate as well as compete for influence, often for the better, for instance contributing to 
improved livelihoods and knowledge for rural communities. However, tensions arise around 
issues of land ownership, and here rural people are caught in the middle, though more 
empowered to play an active role in governance than was possible in previous decades. 
Gender relations have changed and amid the other tensions this transition has been a 
challenging one. Food security on the whole has improved through a combination of 
commercial investment in regional food systems which has raised urban food security and an 
increasing professionalization of relatively small-scale farmers. However, uncertainty around 
the control of land and resources has threatened the stability of incomes for rural 
communities.  
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Save Yourself 
A scenario where non-state actors are the driving force and short-term priorities dominate in 
West Africa by 2050 
Figure 11  Save Yourself 
 
 
Summary: 
In this scenario, where non-state actors are the driving force of change, governments are 
passive, corrupt and unstable, playing a facilitating role for the short-term oriented, extractive 
actions of the private sector, while civil society organizations focus almost exclusively on 
emergency issues and longer-term development objectives are not part of societal debates. 
Extra-regional interventions to try and stabilize Mali have failed and instead led to great 
regional unrest. Hyper-liberal market policies have led to an increasing diversity of available 
food for the urban middle class, while at the same time the rural poor are highly food insecure 
due to the fiercely expansive presence of commercial agriculture. Rural livelihoods are 
decreasing and there are massive movements to urban areas in search of work, ungoverned by 
national governments. Environmental health has suffered greatly from a lack of policy in this 
domain and the scramble for new rural sources of livelihood.  
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Semi-Quantitative Indicators 
In the development of the scenarios, narratives are not the only way to elaborate on scenarios.  
In addition to the development of scenario narratives, a semi-quantitative assessment of key 
indicators was conducted. This set of indicators representing the scope of interest for food 
security, environments and livelihoods was generated by participants. They subsequently 
indicated what they thought were the directions and magnitudes of change for each indicator 
over multiple time steps, and provided the logic for these changes from respective scenario. 
In this way, each of the four scenarios was quantified. 
The following indicators were outlined on a scale of -3 to +3 using descriptions of the logic 
for change:  
 GDP  
 corruption 
 political stability 
 infrastructure development 
 urbanization 
 yields for rain-fed crops 
 yields for irrigated crops 
 area for rain-fed arable land 
 area for irrigated arable land 
 livestock numbers 
 livestock yields 
 agricultural input costs 
 nutrition 
 dietary diversity 
 poverty 
 equity 
 access to health care 
 forest cover change 
 biodiversity 
The semi-quantitative assessments of change conducted by stakeholders provide information 
on the scenarios that can be translated into assumptions to be used as drivers for the 
quantitative model scenario, which will be presented in the following section. Some of the 
indicators, such as changes in GDP growth, improvements in crop and livestock yields, and 
input costs were directly translated into values to be used as drivers within the quantitative 
models. Others such as changes in cropland area and level of deforestation, are final outputs 
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of the model simulations and have been examined in the context of the semi-quantitative 
indicators to improve the consistency of the scenarios. The details of the semi-quantitative 
indicators for each scenario can be found in Appendix C.  
Western Africa Quantitative Regional Scenarios 
When quantified with global partial-equilibrium models, the scenarios provide additional 
insight to region, as well as offer context for the impact of global developments on the region. 
Illustrating the narratives with numbers gives prospective users more detailed information, by 
which the scenarios can be compared to one another more adequately, and that can be applied 
in the testing of policies and research recommendations. Additionally, the models represent a 
structured set of assumptions that can be used to challenge the ideas proposed by the 
narratives and to make each narrative more internally consistent. In an iterative process, the 
regional stakeholders challenged the modelling results if they thought these were not 
plausible from a regional perspective. Furthermore, the scenarios created by the regional 
stakeholders ask questions about the future that might challenge the modelling framework to 
adapt, creating a two-way interaction between the narratives and the modelling results for 
further improvement of the scenarios.  
 
The quantification of the scenarios has two parts. The first part of the quantification involves 
interpretation of the semi-quantitative indicators and logic for change in each scenario into 
number values to be used as drivers in the model. The second part of the quantification 
involves including the factors of change for each scenario into both models and solving the 
model over the time period. This process has been well documented in the working paper by 
Palazzo et al. (2014). The drivers for this quantification, population, GDP, technological 
improvements in crop and livestock yields, farm input costs and others were discussed with 
the scenario developers and then linked to the SSP scenario elements (Dellink, Chateau, 
Lanzi, & Magné, 2015; Kc & Lutz, 2014; O’Neill et al., 2014; O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-
Benedict, et al., 2015) for the region. We have translated the semi-quantitative indicators into 
model drivers by using the socioeconomic drivers of the SSPs as a starting point for CCAFS 
scenarios and made a critical comparison between the stakeholder-generated scenarios and 
the SSPs. The model quantification results are then examined for consistency with the 
scenarios storylines as developed by the stakeholders. In the following section we present the 
quantitative regional scenarios for Western Africa, first as the numerical socioeconomic 
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drivers of change used by both models and second as the modelling results for agricultural 
production, food security, land use, and environmental impacts over the time period 2000-
2050. 
GLOBIOM and IMPACT  
The scenarios were quantified using two agricultural partial-equilibrium economic models, 
each with different assumptions – GLOBIOM (Havlík et al., 2014), developed by the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and IMPACT (Robinson et al., 
2015) developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The features of 
both models are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1  GLOBIOM and IMPACT comparison 
 GLOBIOM IMPACT 
Economic Sector  Agriculture sector including crops, 
livestock, bioenergy, and forestry 
Agriculture sector including crops, ag. processing, 
and livestock 
Time Horizon 2000–2050/2100 2005-2050 
Role of Markets Regional markets linked through global 
markets determine supply and demand 
Global markets determine supply and demand 
Geography Global representing 30 country/regions  Global representing 159 country/regions 
Resolution of 
Production side 
Bottom-up approach at detailed gird-cell 
level (>10,000 worldwide) 
 (4 crop production systems and 8 livestock 
production systems) 
320 food production units (intersection of national 
and hydrological boundaries)  
(2 crop production systems and 8 livestock 
production systems) 
Commodities 30 agricultural commodities  
(18 crops, 5 forest products, 7 livestock 
products, 9 bioenergy products) 
60 agricultural commodities 
(39 crops, 6 livestock, 15 processed goods) 
Environment GHG accounting, irrigation water use, and 
endogenous land-use change 
Hydrology, water basin management of irrigation 
water, exogenous and endogenous cropland area 
expansion 
Climate Change Represented by EPIC crop model Represented by DSSAT crop models and linked 
hydrology models 
Source: Authors 
 
GLOBIOM and IMPACT have a significant focus on the agriculture sector to varying 
degrees of spatial disaggregation and consider the demand and use of products for food, 
livestock feed, bioenergy, and process production. GLOBIOM and IMPACT use the 
underlying assumptions of relationships between supply and demand of products at the initial 
year of the time period (2000 for GLOBIOM, 2005 for IMPACT) and examine how changes 
in certain model drivers change the relationship in the future. The representation of trade 
between the two models offer a significant difference as GLOBIOM employs a spatial 
equilibrium approach and considers regional trade based on bilateral trade policies and 
barriers and transportation costs and the relative cost competitiveness of homogenous goods 
(Takayama and Judge 1971; Schneider et al 2007), whereas IMPACT assumes that country 
markets are linked to global markets through perfect price transmission. Using a multi-model 
approach, while allowing one model to serve as the representative, or “marker” model for the 
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region similar to the Marker Scenario SSP model interpretation, allows us to utilize the 
strengths of both models while addressing the uncertainty of the scenarios. For the 
quantification of the scenarios in Eastern and Western Africa and South Asia, GLOBIOM 
will act as the “marker” model, while IMPACT will represent the scenarios for Southeast 
Asia, Central America, and the Andes. To include the scenario semi-quantitative indicators as 
inputs for the IMPACT and GLOBIOM models, indicators were given numerical values, 
using the socioeconomic drivers of the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) as a starting 
point which is further discussed in the section called “Linking SSPs and CCAFS scenarios”. 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) 
The global scenarios developed by the IPCC community that combine emissions scenarios 
(Representative Concentration Pathways; RCPs) and socio-economic and policy scenarios 
(Shared Socio-economic Pathways; SSPs, and Shared Policy Assumptions; SPAs) (O’Neill et 
al., 2014) contrast the previous set of global change scenarios, the SRES (Nakicenovic et al., 
2000), that combined assumptions on socio-economic development with assumptions on 
emissions in a time-consuming, consecutive process (Zurek & Henrichs, 2007). The new 
process has allowed the global climate models (GCMs) and integrated assessment models 
(IAM) to work in parallel with the RCPs, speeding up the interactions between the modelling 
communities as well as improving the final product, a quantified assessment of plausible 
future development that considers the impact, the role and challenges of adaptation to and 
mitigation of the effects of climate change (O’Neill et al., 2014). The framework to develop 
the scenarios has been thoroughly documented (Müller & Robertson, 2014; O’Neill et al., 
2014; Schweizer & O’Neill, 2013; van Vuuren et al., 2013), linked to previous scenario 
assessments (van Vuuren & Carter, 2013), and are beginning to be scrutinized through a 
national (Absar & Preston, 2015) and human impact (Hasegawa, Fujimori, Takahashi, & 
Masui, 2015) lens. The purpose of this paper is not to explore the process by which the 
integrated scenarios were created but instead to explore their usefulness in addressing the 
uncertainty of future development as tool to build a consistent regional context. This regional 
context serves to assist policy makers in developing robust climate adaptation plans and 
strategies but also provides the scientific community working at the regional, national, and 
sub-national scale with multiple pathways for development, of the agriculture sector in 
particular, that can be disaggregated or linked to adaptation assessments (Antle et al., 2015; 
Kihara et al., 2015; Valdivia et al., 2015). As the concept of the SSP is vital to this purpose, it 
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serves to present a summary of the narratives here. Rather than using two drivers of 
uncertainty, as many future scenarios processes have considered (Nakicenovic et al., 2000; 
Vervoort et al., 2014), these scenarios were built on two-axis, mitigation and adaptation, 
where the outcome, or level of, challenge are the end points of each axis (high and low 
challenges) and the combination of these define “challenge space” of the scenario (O’Neill et 
al., 2014) and are presented in Figure 12. The combination of challenges from which 
scenarios emerged were then constructed by identifying the drivers of the challenge outcomes 
such as population and urbanization (Jiang & O’Neill, 2015; Kc & Lutz, 2014) and economic 
growth (Crespo Cuaresma, 2015; Dellink et al., 2015; Leimbach, Kriegler, Roming, & 
Schwanitz, 2015) and building a rich narrative of each pathway using the quantitative and 
semi-quantitative drivers (O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-Benedict, et al., 2015). The SSPs, as 
they focus globally and offer a long-term focus that exceeds the regional scenario time 
horizon of 2050, are generally more optimistic than the regional scenarios and fail to capture 
some of the uncertainty around governance and political stability that are captured by the 
regional scenarios as they pose a challenge for development in Western Africa.  
 
Figure 12  Five Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) and each SSPs' representation of challenges 
to adaptation to mitigation. 
 
Source: O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-Benedict, et al., 2015 
Representative Agricultural Pathways 
The challenges to study global scenarios of climate impacts and socioeconomic development 
or compare the sector specific pathways of modelling assessments are numerous. The 
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challenge is to, on one hand, integrate and model the key factors of change such as emissions, 
climate forcing, agricultural development and land use change, and human development, and 
on the other hand, to address the issue of uncertainty using a multi-model, multi-scale 
approach. Agriculture continues to remain an important source for income in many regions in 
the world and how it will develop in the future will have significant impacts on the food 
security as well as the environment. Increasingly connected markets, socioeconomic 
development, and future climate uncertainty and vulnerability serve as a motivation for 
developing appropriate trends for agricultural development, known as “representative 
agricultural pathways” (RAPs) for each SSPs (O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-Benedict, et al., 
2015). 
Wilbanks and Ebi (2013) highlight the challenges of long-term projections in impact, 
adaptation and vulnerability (IAV) research to consider quantitative modelling for small 
geographic regions. Linking the global pathways, for any sector but for the agricultural 
sector, to the sub-global, sub-continental, or national pathways is a meaningful way to 
disaggregate and maintain consistency and plausibility (Valdivia et al., 2015; Zurek & 
Henrichs, 2007). National and subnational impact assessments that represent farm systems 
and households of small geographic units often require a globally-consistent market 
equilibria for commodities, which are produced by global or regional economic models. 
(Valdivia et al., 2015). Additionally, drivers of the development of region at local levels can 
influence the adoption of soil and water conservation practices. (Sietz & Van Dijk, 2015). 
The AgMIP community has worked to understand the differences in global and local 
modelling strategies of the agricultural sector (Antle, Stoorvogel, Valdivia, & B, 2014; 
Kihara et al., 2015; Nelson, Valin, et al., 2014). In terms of providing plausible future 
agricultural pathways, an effort was undertaken to examine global economic modelling 
approaches using common drivers for biophysical effects from climate change and 
socioeconomic effects as part of the AgMIP Project (Lotze-Campen et al., 2014; Nelson & 
Shively, 2014; Nelson, van der Mensbrugghe, et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 2014; Schmitz et 
al., 2014; Valin et al., 2014; von Lampe et al., 2014). Two of the global economic models 
participating in the AgMIP exercise, GLOBIOM and IMPACT have also been used quantify 
the regional scenarios.  
Using the unique link between the CCAFS regional scenarios developed with stakeholders 
and quantified by economic models in the plausibility space of the SSPs, we can offer 
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regionally appropriate and climate independent regional RAPs. To some extent, field level 
and subnational economic impact analysis has begun to integrate the agricultural technology 
trends from global economic models (Antle et al., 2015). Outputs from GLOBIOM may 
prove useful in providing inputs for field level modelling of regional representational 
agricultural pathway because it considers multiple management systems, or technologies, the 
biophysical environment of production, or climates, and the socioeconomic context of the 
region (Antle et al., 2015). IMPACT has a long history of providing global trends for 
commodities, and recent modelling improvements have expanded its relevance to include 
nearly all statistically surveyed commodities. As global models, GLOBIOM and IMPACT 
cover the future development of, not only the region, but of the rest of the world creating 
globally-consistent regional scenarios.  
Parallel process 
Although the CCAFS regional scenarios development process has focused its objectives 
around policy engagement and planning, facilitators of the process have been participants of 
the SSP development community (REF). In particular, IIASA has been an active member of 
the SSP development process, first through the development of the scenarios and their 
narratives (O’Neill et al., 2014; O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-Benedict, et al., 2015), and then 
by modelling the future economic and demographic quantitative change for each pathway 
(Kc & Lutz, 2014) needed for integrated-assessment models (IAM). As such, it is follows 
that since the SSPs and the CCAFS scenarios have moved in a parallel direction in terms of 
scenarios development process: participatory, end-state oriented (O’Neill et al., 2014; 
Vervoort et al., 2014); focus: socio-economic development with an uncertainty of future 
climate leading to challenges for adaption; and consistent sources for quantitative drivers of 
future change (Herrero, Havlik, McIntire, Palazzo, & Valin, 2014; O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, 
Kemp-Benedict, et al., 2015; Vervoort et al., 2014; Zurek & Henrichs, 2007), that the the 
scenarios can be linked in a practical way. We have followed Van Ruijven et al (2014) 
suggested methods for downscaling and using the global SSPs for regional impact, 
adaptation, and vulnerability (IAV) studies which include using the SSPs as a boundary 
condition and developing nested regional storylines that would be internally consistent within 
the global framework. In the sections that follow we present the outcomes of the downscaling 
of SSPs within the regionally appropriate storylines of the CCAFS scenarios.  
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Linking SSPs and CCAFS scenarios 
The quantitative drivers for the SSPs can be used as a plausibility envelope for generating the 
initial set of drivers to be tailored to use for modelling context for the CCAFS regional 
scenarios. As a first step it is necessary to find commonality in the narratives and semi-
quantitative indicators in both scenarios exercises. A comparison of the semi-quantitative 
indicators for the CCAFS regional scenarios and those of the SSPs, can find an overlap that 
allows the authors of this paper to make a mapping of the regional scenarios in the context of 
the SSPs space. KC and Lutz (2014) differentiate population growth of countries within SSP 
storylines using fertility rates: low fertility, rich OECD, and high fertility; which 14 of the 15 
Western African belong. The SSP narratives also consider the assumptions for the 
development pathways between the low, middle and high income countries according to the 
World Bank Classification.  
Historically, nearly all of the countries in the ECOWAS region of Western African have been 
categorized as low income countries, and for the GDP projections of the SSPs all of the 
countries in Western Africa were placed in the low income country group (Crespo Cuaresma, 
2015; Dellink et al., 2015; Leimbach et al., 2015).  
We examined the scenario indicators to determine to what extent the scenarios were coherent 
across scales (Zurek & Henrichs, 2007). As a first step, it is important to match what is 
contained within the scenario narratives and the semi-quantitative indicators. The CCAFS 
indicators in some cases, mapped quite easily to the SSP indicators (Table 3 and figure 13), 
such as “gross domestic product” and “growth per capita”, “population growth and 
urbanization” and “urbanization”, and “dietary diversity” and “consumption and diets”, from 
the CCAFS scenarios and SSP scenarios, respectively (O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-
Benedict, et al., 2015).  
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Table 2  Semi-quantitative Indicators of Interest for West Africa Scenarios Stakeholders 
Demographics/Human 
Development 
Population Growth/Urbanization+, * 
Women with higher education* 
Access to health care* 
Access to potable water* 
Equity* 
Prevalence of malaria* 
 
Economy & Lifestyle/ Policies & 
Institutions 
Gross Domestic Product+, * 
Percent population in poverty* 
Dietary Diversity++, * 
Farmer input prices+ 
Transportation infrastructure 
Existence of social protection 
schemes;  
percent population covered * 
Number of community based 
organizations * 
Corruption index * 
Crime rates 
Reports of contaminated food/ food 
borne diseases; aflatoxins * 
 
Environment and Natural 
Resources/ Technology 
Terrestrial species biodiversity 
indicator+, * 
Marine species biodiversity 
indicator * 
Forest cover++, *  
Yields for rainfed crops+, * 
Yields for irrigated crops+, * 
Area for rainfed arable land++, * 
Area for irrigated arable land++, * 
Livestock yield change+, * 
Livestock numbers++ 
Water Availability for Agriculture++, 
* 
 
+ indicates this indicator was translated from semi-quantitative information into values used as a model input 
++ indicates that this indicator is was evaluated in the context as a model output 
* indicates that this indicator aligns to a qualitative element of the SSPs (O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-Benedict, et al., 2015) 
Note: The table shows which indicators are an input or model output and have been grouped into categories consistent with those presented 
by O’Neill et al (2015), also noted are indicators, such as GDP and population growth, further mapped The quantification process of the 
regional scenarios has two parts: interpretation of the stakeholder semi-quantitative indicators, into numerical values to be used as drivers in 
both models; and then running the models over the time period with the drivers for each scenario and examining the model results for 
consistency using the scenarios storylines and the semi-quantitative indicators.  
 
Table 3 elaborates on how we have mapped the CCAFS scenarios indicators with SSP 
indicators. The first column presents the CCAFS semi-quantitative indicators. The second, 
third, and fourth columns present the SSP indicators that can be linked to the CCAFS semi-
quantitative indicators. Each column represents a separate grouping of indicators from 
O’Neill et al. (2015). Colors have been added for the SSP indictors that map to multiple 
CCAFS indicators. In many cases the CCAFS scenarios provide a more detailed regional 
representation of the region than the SSPs by providing multiple indicators for a single SSP 
indicator.  
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Table 3  Mapping of CCAFS semi-quantitative indicators and SSP indicators  
 Demographics Economy & Lifestyle  
Environmental & 
Natural Resources 
Semi-Quantitative Indicators Human Development Policies & Institutions Technology 
Population Growth/Urbanization 
Population growth 
    Urbanization Level 
Urbanization Type 
Women with higher education 
Education 
    Gender equality 
Access to health care 
Access to health facilities, 
water, sanitation 
    
Access to potable water 
Access to health facilities, 
water, sanitation 
    
Equity Equity     
Prevalence of malaria 
Health investments 
    Access to health facilities, 
water, sanitation 
Gross Domestic Product   Growth (per capita)   
Percent population in poverty   Inequality   
Dietary diversity   Consumption and Diet   
Farmer input prices   International Trade Agriculture 
Transportation infrastructure 
  
International Trade 
  Institutions 
Existence of social protection 
schemes; percent population covered 
  Institutions 
  
Number of community based 
organizations 
Societal Participation Institutions 
  
Corruption index   Institutions   
Crime rates   Institutions   
Reports of contaminated food/ food 
borne diseases; aflatoxins 
Access to health facilities, 
water, sanitation 
Institutions 
  
Terrestrial species biodiversity 
indicator   
Environmental policy Environment 
Marine species biodiversity indicator 
  
Environmental policy Environment 
Forest cover      Land Use 
Livestock yields and numbers     Agriculture 
Yields for rainfed/irrigated crops 
    
Agriculture 
Area for rainfed/irrigated arable land 
    
Agriculture 
Land Use 
Water availability for agriculture 
    
Agriculture 
Land Use 
Environment 
Source: O’Neill et al. 2015 
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For example, “access to health care”, “access to potable water”, and “prevalence of malaria” 
fall under the “access to health facilities, water, and sanitation” indicator from the narrative 
elaboration of the SSPs (O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-Benedict, et al., 2015). Even though 
access to health care is not an indicator that can be quantitatively examined in the modelling 
of the scenarios it is still useful to use for mapping purposes which are presented in Figure 
13. The CCAFS scenario is given in Column A, the CCAFS semi-quantified indicator is 
found in column B. Column I contains the SSP name that corresponds 1 to 1 with the CCAFS 
scenario and the SSP indicator to compare is in Column L. The qualitative information for 
each indicator of each SSP is taken from O’Neill et al. (2015) and appears in Column M. We 
have added color to the qualitative information of each indicator based on how well the 
narrative/indicator of each SSP fits with the narrative/indicator of each CCAFS scenario. 
Green indicates a “good match”, yellow indicates a “neutral match”, and red indicates a “bad 
match”.  
For Save Yourself, SSP3: Fragmentation matches well in that both scenarios assume low 
access to health care, however access to potable water improves, though not dramatically, due 
to profit-driven investments, which is not in line with SSP qualitative information. Self-
Determination and Civil Society to the Rescue? also match to their SSP well as they both 
describe improvements to the access to health care and potable water, high (SSP1: 
Sustainability) and medium (SSP2: Middle of the Road) access, respectively. However, Cash, 
Control, Calories does not map as well because the CCAFS narrative describes an 
improving, but unstable future where some strides are made to improve access but the system 
is still overwhelmed by the growing population, whereas SSP 5: Conventional Development 
sees a future with high access to health care and sanitation. We have flagged this mis-
mapping as “neutral”, because it neither supports a good match to the SSP nor supports a bad 
match to this SSP. 
The scenario insights into the prevalence of malaria in the region are complicated to map 
directly to the SSP indicators for access to health care and sanitation because prevention of 
malaria relies on not only investments in water and sanitation infrastructure to limit mosquito 
breeding, but also access to and use of preventative measures such as mosquito nets. In Civil 
Society to the Rescue?, action to reduce the prevalence of malaria begins quickly and 
continues over the entire period due to the actions of the CSOs in deploying mosquito nets, 
an effective action that cannot be captured within the SSP indicators, while in Self-
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Determination actions by the state to improve water infrastructures and sanitation improve 
the incidence, albeit later in the period. We view the mis-mappings of the SSP indicators for 
health investments and access to health care and sanitation with CCAFS scenario indicator 
for malaria as an important message from the regional stakeholders that improving 
livelihoods requires engagement from multiple institutions as well as scientific and culture 
understanding of the multiple challenges to and solutions for a problem as complicated as the 
prevention and treatment of malaria.  
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Figure 13  Comparison of the CCAFS semi-quantitative indicators of access to health care (top four lines, left columns A-G), access to potable water 
(middle four lines, left columns A-G) and prevalence of malaria bottom four lines, left columns A-G) with the SSP indicator access to health facilities, 
water, and sanitation. Colors are added based on how well the narrative/indicator of each SSP fits with the narrative/indicator of each CCAFS scenario: 
green indicates a “good match”, yellow indicates a “neutral match”, and red indicates a “bad match”. Note also that prevalence of malaria is also 
mapped to the SSP indicator for health investments.  
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Additionally, the CCAFS scenarios consider the impacts of food safety in the region which 
reflect the strength of institutions to monitor food production system as well as home access 
to prepare, consume, and store safe and healthy food, which falls outside the scope of focus 
for the SSP narratives (O’Neill, Kriegler, Ebi, Kemp-Benedict, et al., 2015). Although the 
impacts of food safety are not modelled by GLOBIOM or IMPACT, the richness of the 
narratives has helped in the downscaled scenarios workshops such as the Ghana Institute of 
Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) in July 2014 which highlighted the current 
functional and non-functional connections between basic nutrition and education among other 
things, and how the scenarios would play out on regional, national, district, and village 
scales.  
In the following four paragraphs we offer our translation of the CCAFS scenarios to the SSP 
scenarios. 
Self-Determination, is a scenario where strong state actors focus on long-term issues, semi-
quantitative indicators align closely with the SSP1: Sustainability, in nearly all qualitative 
elements describing the SSP narrative, such as investments in productivity and extension 
services, increased education and health and sanitation services, regulations to reduce 
deforestation, and effective social protection schemes.  
The scenario is not entirely coherent with the SSP narrative on land use because the CCAFS 
scenario assumes that the progress to avoid deforestation takes time and improved 
productivity in the agriculture sector could have environmental impacts through increased 
fertilizer use. The CCAFS scenarios also highlight the struggle for institutional change 
opening up the opportunity for corruption, which is inconsistent with SSP1 where strong 
institutions are effective at the national and international levels.  
Save Yourself is a scenario where action is not taken by the weak and unstable governments, 
but by CSOs in an emergency response manner and the private sector acting with short-term 
profitability interests, mirroring the low-income country narrative of SSP4: Inequality and the 
overall global narrative of SSP3: Regional Rivalry. This scenario sees low technology 
development for the agriculture sector (with investments limited to export crops or large scale 
industrial farming), widespread environmental degradation and deforestation due to lack of 
regulation and enforcement, and health and food security issues due to growing inequality 
and high population growth.  
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Civil Society to the Rescue? is a scenario where weak governments are replaced with strong 
CSOs tackling food security with a long-term focus, is most closely represented by SSP2: 
Middle of the Road. Some actions for protection lead to a decline in deforestation rates, but 
modest productivity and commercialization benefits fall to those who already have capacity 
rather than inducing a transformation of small-holders, and moderate increases in education 
and health issues are largely taken up by CSOs.  
The short-sighted prioritization of governments interested in maintaining power, within the 
Cash, Control, Calories scenario, create an highly urbanized, high economic growth, 
resource-intense diet scenario driving reactive and politically motivated investments in 
education and health services, (similar to the SSP5: Fossil-fuelled Development). The 
narrative for SSP5, global and long-term, relies on an underlying assumption about the 
availability and adoption of technology solutions for agriculture that within the narrative of 
Cash, Control, Calories is not available and limits the intra-regional cooperation to protect 
environment. The weaknesses of institutions, and the sputtering economic development 
within the region have created environmental challenges by 2050 that may not be captured 
entirely by the storyline of SSP5. However, O’Neill et al (2015) discuss the possibility that of 
actions taken within a development pathway may change the pathway and alter the 
challenges for adaptation or mitigation, which can be seen by the end of the time period in 
Cash, Control, Calories.  
After thorough the linkage of the CCAFS scenarios with the SSP scenarios we present the 
drivers of the CCAFS scenarios used by in the economic models and then later revisit the 
semi-quantitative indicators when examining the model outputs to provide feedback for 
consistency in the narratives. For the SSP indicators that have been numerically quantified 
already, such as urbanization and population (Jiang & O’Neill, 2015; Kc & Lutz, 2014), 
economic growth (Crespo Cuaresma, 2015; Dellink et al., 2015; Leimbach et al., 2015), and 
the resulting transformation of the livestock sector (Herrero et al., 2014), were used as an 
envelope of plausibility and the regional values were adjusted to match the context of the 
CCAFS scenario.  
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Quantitative Regional Drivers  
Socioeconomic Development: GDP and Population Growth 
Economic development and population growth are essential elements in determining future 
demand of agricultural products within the modelling framework. To be used in the 
quantitative models, we considered the GDP and population projections to be linked due to 
the importance of the per capita income in food demand. We employed a “one-to-one” 
mapping system (Zurek & Henrichs, 2007) of the GDP per capita of the SSPs to the CCAFS 
scenarios. The SSPs, focused globally and under a longer-term perspective that exceeds the 
regional scenario time horizon of 2050, are generally more optimistic than the regional 
scenarios and fail to capture some of the uncertainty around governance and political stability 
that are captured by the regional scenarios as they pose a challenge for development in 
Western Africa. Therefore we used the scenario narratives, semi-quantitative indicators, 
including logic and direction of changes to relate and adjust the socioeconomic and 
demographic developments for the SSPs over the same time period as quantified by the SSP 
developers (Dellink et al., 2015; Kc & Lutz, 2014; O’Neill et al., 2014). Under these 
socioeconomic futures, in Western Africa, the population of the region grows from 300 
million in 2010 to between almost 600 million (Self-Determination and SSP1) and 800 
million (Save Yourself, SSP3 and SSP4) (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14  Population of Western Africa in millions of people for the CCAFS scenarios and SSPs. Note 
that the axis begins at 250 million. 
 
 
GDP per capita increases across all scenarios, but by 2050 all remain lower than the regional 
SSP projections. Cash, Control, Calories initially sees the largest increase, but its GDP 
development is unstable, and it begins to slow and actually declines slightly after 2040 –
reflecting the short-termism of the scenario. Per capita GDP is highest in Self-Determination 
by 2050. Civil Society to the Rescue? experiences a steady and consistent increase in per 
capita GDP, albeit not a particularly large one over time. Per capita GDP in Save Yourself 
increases the least of the scenarios over the time period and follows cycles of growth and 
recession, which represents unstable economic development (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15  Relative change in GDP per capita 2000-2050 for the CCAFS scenarios and SSPs (2000=1) 
(note that the axis appears in a log2 scale for ease of viewing the values) 
Note: for the scenario time horizon, GLOBIOM is run decennially while IMPACT is run annually.  
 
 
Agricultural Productivity: Crop and Livestock Yields 
Crops 
Technical progress in crop production is represented in both models through an increase in 
crop yields. As a starting point for the future projections of crop yields, we have used an 
econometric estimate of the relationship between crop yields and GDP per capita assumptions 
of the SSPs (Herrero et al., 2014). The crop yield projections, with the SSPs values being a 
starting point, consider the scenario narratives on agricultural productivity both for scenario-
specific storylines as well as crop-specific productivity. The exogenous change this would 
have on domestically produced calories are presented in Figure 16 for the CCAFS scenarios 
and SSP2, for Western Africa as well as globally. Although these yields, being exogenous 
drivers and not model outputs, do not represent the transitions between low-input low-
yielding crop systems to high-input, high-yield crop systems or reallocation of crop 
production to highly productive land or crop types, the yield gap between Western Africa and 
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the global average will remain a challenge for the agricultural system even in the scenario 
with the highest investment in agriculture, Self-Determination.  
Figure 16  Aggregate Exogenous Crop Yields (gigacalories per ha) for Western Africa and global 
average: Global average is represented by the grey dashed line and Western Africa are the solid 
lines 
 
 
Livestock 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been the focus of a recent foresight study to examine the potential of 
the region to meet a growing demand for livestock products, through transitions from 
extensive land based systems to mixed crop-livestock systems and also yield improvements 
by feed utilization(Herrero et al., 2014). The suggested actions (intensifying pastoral systems 
while also protecting pastoralist and protecting animal health) echo those made in the West 
African assessment of livestock by the Sahel West African Club Secretariat and OCED 
(Kamuanga, Somada, Sanon, & Kagoné, 2008).  
One measure of the future productivity of livestock is the conversion efficiency of livestock 
product per unit of feed. The projections of conversion efficiencies for livestock as presented 
in African Livestock Futures (Herrero et al 2014) for the SSPs were used as a starting point 
for the regional scenarios and were further developed using the narratives and semi-
quantitative drivers. The investment in ruminant production due to the growing demand as 
outlined in the scenario narratives result in a yield improvement in Self-Determination, while 
the focus of dairy production and monogastric production in the early decades of Cash, 
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Control, Calories is considered. In Civil Society to the Rescue? meat demand drives the 
investments from private sector and social entrepreneurs. Little investment is made for 
livestock or veterinary services in the Save Yourself scenario resulting in relatively 
insignificant yield improvements.  
Biophysical Effects from Climate Change 
West Africa is highly dependent on agriculture, predominantly rainfed agriculture, which at 
the mercy of a changing climate, making the region particularly vulnerable. The strictly 
biophysical impacts on crop production due to changes in climate have been examined 
extensively within the model intercomparison communities of AgMIP and ISI-MIP through 
globally-gridded crop models (Müller & Robertson, 2014). For Western Africa, the 
modelling of impacts through crop models as well as through empirical study find that the 
negative impacts of climate change on agriculture are robust, though the magnitude of impact 
remains uncertain (Müller, Cramer, Hare, & Lotze-Campen, 2011; Müller & Robertson, 
2014; Müller, 2011; Roudier, Sultan, Quirion, & Berg, 2011; Sultan et al., 2013). These 
studies stress role of temperature change and of carbon fertilization in the region, and 
highlight the challenge to produce meaningful scientific projections from studies with 
significant methodological differences (Müller et al., 2011).  
Integrating the impacts of biophysical effects from climate change on crop production and the 
economic implications within the global agricultural system, have been carried out using 
globally-gridded crop models and economic models, including GLOBIOM and IMPACT 
(Nelson, Valin, et al., 2014). The modelling community has not evaluated the climate effects 
on grassland productivity to the same extent as crop productivity (Wheeler & Reynolds, 
2012), although these effect have been recently incorporated into GLOBIOM to understand 
the economic and land use implications (Havlík et al., 2015). Additionally, assessments of 
agriculture under future climate change have considered impacts of alternative adaptation 
strategies (Leclère et al., 2014) and the role of trade (Mosnier et al., 2014) using the 
GLOBIOM model. Expanding on the global climate and adaptation analysis of agriculture 
from Nelson et al (Nelson et al., 2010), which uses the IMPACT model to examine the 
effects of climate change under three global socio-economic futures, national level impacts 
the focus for three regions within Africa (Hachigonta, Sepo, Nelson, Gerald C., Thomas, 
Timothy S., & Sibanda, Lindiwe M., 2013; Jalloh, Nelson, Thomas, Zougmoré, & Roy-
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Macauley, 2013; Waithaka, Michael, Nelson, Gerald C., Thomas, Timothy S., & Kyotalimye, 
Miriam, 2013).  
IMPACT and GLOBIOM consider multiple general circulation models (GCMs) and different 
biophysical crop models to capture the uncertainty of the biophysical impacts of climate 
change on crop yields (see Table 4). Impacts are not limited to only the Western African 
region but applied globally using the relative changes in the globally-gridded crop models 
yields from 2000 (Nelson, Valin, et al., 2014; Nelson, van der Mensbrugghe, et al., 2014).  
Table 4  Climate Scenarios 
Representative 
Concentration  
Pathway 
General  
Circulation  
Models 
Crop  
Model 
Suite1 
Crops2 Grassland CO2 Fertilization 
8.5 
 GFDL-ESM2M  
 HadGEM2-ES 
 IPSL-CM5 
 MIROC-ESM  
 
EPIC 
Barley,  
Dry Beans, Cassava, 
Chickpea, Maize, 
Cotton,  
Groundnut, Millet, 
Potato, Rapeseed, 
Rice, Soybeans,  
Sorghum, 
Sugarcane, 
Sunflower, Sweet 
Potato, and Wheat 
Yes 
Additional CO2 
fertilization for 
both crops and 
grassland 
DSSAT 
Groundnut, Maize, 
Potato, Rice, 
Sorghum, Soybean, 
and Wheat 
No 
CO2 fertilization 
at current levels 
Constant 2000 
climate 
 Represented by each models’ baseline assumptions 
without climate change 
Note: All GCM climate data comes from CMIP and ISI MIP (Taylor et al. 2012) and are downscaled for use in the crop models.  
1 The EPIC crop models are used by GLOBIOM, and the DSSAT crop models are used by IMPACT 
2 Crops represented in the economic models not covered by their respective crop model suite are mapped from the above crops based on 
biophysical similarities 
 
Regional Integration: Production Costs 
While the state and potential for economic integration within Africa and the ECOWAS 
community has been scrutinized and estimated (UNCTAD, 2012; United Nations, 2009); the 
effects of regional integration as it pertains to food security have also been examined by 
quantitative modelling (Dijk, 2011) The degree to which regional integration efforts are 
succeeding within agriculture highlight the challenges facing the region, where competing 
national interests and standards often clash with competing international donor initiatives 
(Rohrbach, Minde, & Howard, 2003).  
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Simson and Tang (2013) suggest that shocks in the agricultural supply chain, stemming from 
conflicts or climate change, are one of the most important causes of food insecurity in the 
ECOWAS region. Conflicts are highlighted in each of the scenarios, however, the lack of 
strong state governments combined with short-term priority setting, in Save Yourself give this 
scenario the most potential for food insecurity. Limitations in the trade of both the inputs to 
and products of agriculture can have profound effects on food security (Baldos & Hertel, 
2015; Mosnier et al., 2014). The CCAFS scenario narratives consider the challenges to 
regional integration, which have been brought into the quantitative modelling of GLOBIOM 
through impacts in the farm input costs. 
For instance, the state-led regional integration policies of Cash, Control, Calories, are poorly 
coordinated and lack a long term focus, which over time cause similar failures in regional 
integration noted by Tarvares and Tang (2013), such as countries overly committed to 
integration programs in multiple, overlapping regional organizations leading to lower 
program implementation overall and programs that are overly bureaucratic and lack 
involvement from the private sector, increasing the costs of production for the region increase 
by 15%. The weak governments unable to control the regional stability in Save Yourself, 
create an environment where conflicts severely limit access to markets and raise costs of 
production 25% for farmers. In Civil Society to the Rescue?, lack of coordination between the 
private sector and civil society organizations in negotiating integration programs and 
investing in infrastructure planning increase the costs of production for farmers (smallholder 
and large scale), limited to 15%. Self-Determination sees improved regional integration 
through merging of regional organizations led by member countries with a focus on the long-
term development of the region and therefore the production costs for the region remain 
unchanged.  
Cropland Area 
GLOBIOM models the competition for land endogenously, meaning that sectors compete for 
land based on the value of the land for production of wood products, crops, and livestock 
grazing, as well as the cost and suitability associated with converting the land to other uses 
(Havlík et al., 2014). To harmonize the quantitative modelling results, cropland area 
expansion as modelled by GLOBIOM was used as an input into IMPACT. Within IMPACT, 
the distribution of crop area by crop type and management system, in this case irrigated or 
rainfed cropland area, remained endogenous. Cropland expands in the region nearly 55% in 
SSP 2 by 2050, with expansion in Cash, Control, Calories and Self-Determination increasing 
less (4% and 9% less, respectively) and Save Yourself and Civil Society to the Rescue? 
increasing slightly more (4% and 2% more).  
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Globally-Consistent Regional Scenarios: Development outside of West Africa 
IMPACT and GLOBIOM are global in scope and consider the future development for 
Western Africa as well as for the rest of the world, providing insights into how the region will 
be affected by forces outside its control, such as global markets and climate change. As these 
impacts can have profound effect and to better examine the impact of the CCAFS scenarios 
assumptions within the region, the global context was assumed to follow the population and 
economic development of the SSP2: Middle of the Road over the time period, where, by 
2050, the global population reaches 9.2 billion people (Kc & Lutz 2014) and the global 
average GDP per capita is expected to double and to reach around 16,000 USD. This 
assumption was unchanged among the scenarios to examine the impact of the scenarios 
assumptions within the region.  
As discussed earlier, the climate impacts on crop yields are also applied globally. The 
impacts of climate change on agriculture will be worse for some regions (Nelson et al. 2010; 
Leclère et al. 2014; Mosnier et al. 2014). Without considering the potential climate impacts to 
the regions outside of West Africa, we would underestimate the total climate change impacts, 
both the local effects as well as the effects on regions from which West Africa imports. 
Quantitative Plausible Regional Development  
In the following section, the scenarios for Western Africa, quantified using the GLOBIOM 
and IMPACT models, are summarized to create a complete picture of the changes over time 
and among the scenarios in terms of socio-economic and agricultural development. The use 
of the quantified scenarios results as a plausible future for the regional development as they 
are presented here have been used by policy makers to test policy options under possible 
futures. In addition to highlighting the regional demand and supply of crop and livestock 
products, we present the impacts of the scenarios in the improving food security and 
protecting the environment.  
Crop and Livestock Production  
Agricultural production currently accounts for about a quarter of the region’s GDP, but as 
much as 35% in the 1980s (World Bank Development Indicators, 2015). Western Africa as a 
region is the leader, or among the top global producers of cassava, millet, sorghum, and oil 
palm (FAOSTAT, 2015). In particular, the groundnut, sorghum, cassava, and millet 
production in the region accounts for nearly 15, 20, 30, and 40 percent of world’s production, 
respectfully. Cassava production in the region is particularly strong, in part due to the local 
efforts of the CGIAR research centers: International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) 
located in Ibadan, Nigeria and Centro Internacional de Agricultural Tropical (CIAT) located 
in Cali, Colombia. Although cassava is primarily seen as a staple food crop is consumed less 
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as incomes rise, it is also utilized as livestock feed in some parts of the world making it still a 
highly important crop due to a growing demand for meat products from rising income. Other 
important crops such as rice and corn are also highly produced in the region and though the 
region’s share of the total global production is limited to around 1 percent (Figure 18).  
Figure 17  Share of source of production growth based on the rate of growth, “area” implies 
cropland area expansion and “yield” implies increase in the aggregate crop yield in dry matter tons 
per hectare 
 
 
To model changes in crop yields over time, both GLOBIOM and IMPACT use the 
technological improvements as a starting point for potential yield growth. Additionally, 
yields will reflect the changes between production systems6 and, within GLOBIOM, the 
reallocation of crop production to more or less productive areas. Increases in production over 
time will come from a combination of the scenario yield improvements, expansion of the 
crop to current cropland including transitions between production systems, and expansion of 
the crop to new cropland taking into account the costs associate with land conversion and 
transitions between systems. ). Historically, increases in production within the region have 
come from expansions in cropland area rather than through significant yield improvements 
(Byerlee, Stevenson, & Villoria, 2014; Hillocks, 2002). In the CCAFS scenarios, this 
 
 
6 in GLOBIOM: extensive rainfed, intensive rainfed, and irrigated; in IMPACT: rainfed and irrigated 
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historical trend continues in the Save Yourself and Civil Society to the Rescue? scenarios, 
where slightly more than half the share of the average annual growth rate in production from 
2000-2050 comes from crop area expansion and less than half from yield improvements. In 
terms of total crop and livestock production, by 2050, Self-Determination produces the most 
in terms of quantity and in terms of calories, with Cash, Control, Calories producing the 
second most (Figure 17). Overall, crop production in the region increases from 2010 to 2050 
for all scenarios, with Self-Determination having the highest levels of crop production and 
Save Yourself having the least growth in crop production. The development of crops in the 
region remains of particular importance to the global production by 2050, especially for 
millet, cassava, and sorghum (Figure 18). Climate impacts are applied to the crop yields in 
GLOBIOM and IMPACT as relative differences in simulations of crop growth from globally-
gridded crop models that use conditions of future climates from GCM models (Leclère et al., 
2014; Mosnier et al., 2014; Müller & Robertson, 2014; Nelson, van der Mensbrugghe, et al., 
2014). 
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Figure 18  Western Africa’s Share of Crop Production by crop (large circles) and the Region’s 
Production Share of Global Production by crop (smaller circles) in dry matter for 2010 (top most 
figure) and in 2050 by scenario (figures in lower four rectangles) 
2010 
 
 Self-Determination in 2050 Cash, Control, Calories in 2050 
 
 
Civil Society to the Rescue? in 2050 Save Yourself in 2050 
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Note: The large Circle represents each crop’s share of the total crop production in Western Africa (excluding tree crops) in dry matter. Slices 
in the smaller circles of the same color represent Western Africa’s share of the global production of the respective crops. Note that for the 
2050 scenarios, Western Africa’s share of global production of maize has been removed because the share remains very small. Source: 
FAOSTAT 2015 (2010); GLOBIOM model results (2050). 
Cassava 
In the decades leading up to 2000, cassava production in Western Africa increased due to an 
increasing harvested area (+300% expansion from 1965-2000) rather than through yield 
improvements (+30% total growth from 1965-2000) (Hillocks, 2002; FAOSTAT, 2015). As 
cassava in the region, historically, has been planted because of its hardiness in periods of 
drought and pest and disease resistance in an effort to reduce periods of food insecurity 
(Hillocks, 2002). The CCAFS scenarios consider the importance of this crop to food security 
in the future by, on one hand a future with continuation of the historically small increase in 
yields such as with Save Yourself or, on the other hand, increases in investments from the 
national and regional level and dissemination in high yielding varieties leading to an annual 
growth in Self-Determination that is nearly double the historical trend (Appendix E, Figure 
E4). Despite its hardiness, the impact of climate change on cassava yields is considerable and 
when compared to a climate neutral future, depressing yields by as little as 3% or as much as 
35% (Figure 19). However, in the scenario with the highest yield improvements Self-
Determination, the cassava yields that consider climate change are in nearly all cases higher 
than the scenarios with no climate change, suggesting that investments in increasing cassava 
yields may be a solution for an uncertain climate future (Figure 19).  
Maize  
Production of maize has grown dramatically in recent years, with area under maize 
cultivation increasing 4.6% per year from 1980-2010 (Appendix E, Figure E3). Yields for 
maize in Western Africa increased 250% from 1961-2013 (FAOSTAT, 2015), despite the 
yield gap relative to the rest of the world (Fischer, Byerlee, & Edmeades, 2014). GLOBIOM 
projects that the productivity investments and production reallocation will lead to a 
significant yield increase over the time period for Self-Determination (+246%) and Cash, 
Control, Calories (+233%). In 2050, maize yields in the high yield future of Self-
Determination will be closer to the year 2000 yields for Central European Union countries 
(3.69 tons/ha) (FAOSTAT, 2015). Climate change is estimated to reduce maize yields in 
some cases quite significantly compared to a climate neutral world (-3.0% to -25%). 
IMPACT projects a more modest estimate of around 60% in yields from 2010-2050 in the 
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higher yield scenarios, and between 30-40% in the lower yielding scenarios an increase. In 
IMPACT, the effects from climate change reduces yields for maize are reduced significantly 
(-9% to -57%). The effects in the yields from IMPACT are far greater than those from 
GLOBIOM, because IMPACT estimates the crop yields using a crop model that does not 
consider the impacts of CO2 fertilization. The impacts of CO2 fertilization on crop yields are 
included in the EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated Climate model) crop modelling 
simulations used within GLOBIOM, while IMPACT simulates climate impacts without CO2 
fertilization with DSSAT (Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer) (Table 1). 
The scientific community has yet to reach an agreement on the whether the potential benefits 
from increases in CO2 can be taken up and used by crops, especially if temperature and 
precipitation reduce crop yields, but taken together the yields from GLOBIOM and IMPACT 
can show the potential range of the biophysical and economic impacts on crop yields from 
climate change.  
Millet  
Western Africa contributes more than 40% to the global supply of millet, the highest share 
for crops produced in the region (FAOSTAT, 2015) (Service, Division, Division, & Pradesh, 
1996). International trade in millet is low, with around 4% of the global production traded 
internationally, although about 9% of the millet produced in Western Africa was exported 
outside the region at the beginning of the century (FAOSTAT, 2015). From 1980-2000, 
production increased around 2.7% per year due primarily to cropland expansion (2.3% per 
year growth) rather than yield improvements (0.5% per year growth) (Appendix E, Figure 
E1). In the CCAFS scenarios, production follows the historical trends for Self-Determination, 
though more than half the annual growth in production coming from improvement in yields. 
The additional growth in production in other the scenarios, more than half of which comes 
from area expansion, allows the region to keep up with demand and retain most of its 
competitiveness by 2050. However in Save Yourself, which has the lowest growth yields over 
the period, millet becomes an imported crop by 2040. The climate impacts on millet may 
seem inconsistent at first glance (+41% in MIROC; -0.31% for IPSL), however other 
assessments that use a regional specific crop model find that the purely biophysical crop 
yields under varied climatic conditions produce negative effects in nearly 88% of scenarios 
(Sultan et al., 2013) (Figure 19). 
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Sorghum 
Sorghum is the one of the most produced crop in the region grown for to its drought 
resilience, where it is used both for human and livestock consumption (Fischer et al., 2014). 
From 1963-2010, production in the region doubled, while yields increased 30% over that 
same period, though yields have had the longest steady upward trend in yield growth since 
1990. Western Africa contributed around 20% of the global share of the sorghum 
(FAOSTAT, 2015; Figure 18) at the start of the century, and by 2050 its global contribution 
grows to between 22% and 25% (Save Yourself and Self-Determination). Nigeria, the largest 
sorghum producer in Western Africa, saw a sharp decline since 2009 in sorghum production, 
due to a shift in crop area to other cereals (Gourichon, 2013). However, the CCAFS scenarios 
consider sorghum to maintain its prominence in the region to 2050, with production 
increasing on average 2.4% per year (Appendix E, Figure E2). Increases in yields are seen for 
both models. Over the period 2010-2050 sorghum yields in GLOBIOM increase from almost 
100% (in Save Yourself) 150% (in Self-Determination) (Figure 19). Sorghum yields in 
IMPACT have a more modest increase with yields increasing 36% (in Save Yourself) to 75% 
(in Self-Determination). Both models project that the effects of climate change lower yields 
(in four of the five GCMs), but for those remaining GCMs, the models differ on the 
magnitude of negative effects: yield loss of 15% compared to a 2000 climate for IMPACT 
and 51% yield loss for GLOBIOM.  
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Figure 19  Relative change in average crop yields for maize, cassava, and millet compared to 2010 
yields as modelled by GLOBIOM and IMPACT for the Scenarios with and without the climate change 
effects on crop growth included (note: the y-axis is not the same for both models 
 
GLOBIOM Maize Yields in 2050 (compared 
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IMPACT Maize Yields in 2050 (compared 
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GLOBIOM Sorghum Yields in 2050 
(compared with 2010 values) 
IMPACT Sorghum Yields in 2050 
(compared with 2010 values) 
  
 
Livestock  
The development of the livestock sector in Western Africa, of which contributions to the 
national GDP range from 10%-15% (Kamuanga et al., 2008), depend on not only the overall 
productivity in the region to meet the growing demand but also supporting the transformation 
of livestock systems from pastoral to mixed systems, where more productive livestock both 
graze and consume feed crops. In the CCAFS scenarios, the investments in livestock 
production nearly doubles the total livestock output of dairy and ruminant and monogastric 
meat for Cash, Control, Calories and Self-Determination. Although there is little investment 
in the livestock sector (aside from the dairy sector) in Save Yourself and limited investment in 
Civil Society to the Rescue?, the scenarios still see an annual increase of total livestock 
production of around 2%.  
While the increase in both ruminant and monogastric meat is largest for Self-Determination 
(closely followed by Cash, Control, Calories), Save Yourself has the least productive 
livestock sector of the scenarios, but still sees a large expansion in the dairy sector. The per 
capita demand for dairy is the lowest in Save Yourself, but due to large growth in population, 
the total dairy demand is highest. This drives the growth in supply, although most of the 
demand for dairy is met with imports. Not surprising, in the scenario with the least 
investment in dairy over the period (Civil Society to the Rescue?) has the largest imports as a 
share of the total milk production. Interestingly, in Self-Determination, where a productive 
crop sector competes for land with the livestock sector for grassland, dairy production grows 
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the least out of all scenarios by 2050, suggesting that milk imports are cheaper than 
regionally produced milk.  
In Western Africa, over the time period ruminant livestock numbers increase for all 
scenarios, although the share of bovines to sheep and goats shifts in nearly all scenarios from 
60% bovine [40% sheep and goats] to 60% sheep and goat [40% bovine] by 2050 in TLUs. 
The expansion of bovine numbers comes not only through an expansion of mixed-crop 
livestock systems in the humid and arid regions but also through a decline in land-based 
grazing systems. With sheep and goats, land-based grazing systems and mixed-crop livestock 
systems in humid systems increase fivefold. Ruminant meat production in Western Africa 
increases 275% by 2050 compared to 2010 in SSP2 with Self-Determination producing 9% 
more and Save Yourself producing 20% less than in SSP2. For monogastric meat production 
(pork and poultry meat), when compared with SSP2 in 2050, the additional investments in 
monogastrics in the Cash, Control, Calories and Self-Determination scenario produce 5% 
and 30% more meat respectively, while the both Civil Society and Save Yourself produce less 
meat than in SSP2 (nearly 84% less in Save Yourself).  
The strictly biophysical climate impacts on grassland productivity as modelled by EPIC and 
are relatively negative for the region (Figure 20). Climate change for all GCMs except 
MIROC, reduces grassland production. Although the quantification of the drivers for the 
CCAFS scenarios did not consider direct impacts on grassland productivity, the feedbacks 
from other drivers as well as expansion of grassland for livestock production increase 
Western Africa’s grassland production compared to the climate change future in all scenarios 
except for Save Yourself. The overall production in Save Yourself is less than the potential 
production under climate change with no endogenous feedbacks, suggesting that actions or 
inactions this scenario, such as expanding pastures and limited productivity for animal feed, 
could exacerbate the effects of climate change.  
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Figure 20  Grassland production under climate and socio-economic scenario for Western Africa: 
Endogenous grassland production for each climate and regional socio-economic scenario (colored 
circle) and exogenous climate effects on grassland production (represented by the black square) 
 
 
Land Use Change  
To understand how the development of the agriculture sector in each scenario will affect the 
land use we identify where the cropland and grassland expansion occurs: within Western 
Africa, outside the Western Africa but within Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the rest of the 
world.  
GLOBIOM endogenously models the global demand for land by considering the main users 
of land. IMPACT, which can model cropland expansion endogenously, uses the changes in 
total cropland as modelled by GLOBIOM as in input to harmonize the modelling of land use.  
Increases in food demand are met by the region’s supply through productivity increases or 
though expansion of crop and grassland. Demand not met by regional production will be met 
by increased production from outside the region. Shifting agricultural expansion outside the 
region can lead to unintended environmental effects such as deforestation.  
Globally, agricultural area expands more than 11% in SSP2 by 2050 and while there is 
relatively little difference when comparing the Middle-of-the-Road SSP2 scenario among the 
CCAFS scenarios. The difference in agricultural area between the scenarios to a savings of 
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6.2 million ha (Self-Determination) or an expansion of 2.6 million ha (Save Yourself) globally 
by 2050 compared to SSP2. The Green Revolution, where the adoption of improved seeds 
increased agriculture output worldwide, is credited with saving at least twice as much land 
over forty years in developing countries from being converted to agricultural land 
(Stevenson, Villoria, Byerlee, Kelley, & Maredia, 2013).  
Although the deforestation and conversion of natural land within Western Africa is highest in 
SSP2 than in the CCAFS scenario, the pristine forest area and natural land converted to 
agricultural land (cropland and pasture land) is slightly higher in Self-Determination than in 
the other CCAFS scenarios suggesting that the assumed market conditions and large 
agricultural productivity gains increase the profitability and may incentivize expanding crop 
and grassland, in what is known as Jevon’s paradox (Alcott, 2005; Byerlee et al., 2014). 
However, the regional level hides the true global land sparing in Self-Determination. When 
compared to the average conversion of natural land in the other CCAFS scenarios, Self-
Determination saves almost 3.64 ha outside the region for every 1 ha converted within the 
region. On average, of the unconverted agricultural area half is saved from within Africa. 
Shifting the share of production growth from area expansion to yield improvements is an 
indication that the region may be increasing the profitability in Self-Determination (Appendix 
E). In Save Yourself, where the regional agriculture sector struggles and the lack of regional 
integration keeps farm input prices high, less land is used for agriculture in the region by 
2050, but at the expense of, on average, 4.5 million additional agricultural area converted 
outside the region (most of which is natural land). Similarly, the relative land sparing that 
occurs globally in Cash, Control, Calories and Civil Society to the Rescue?, comes from a 
large decrease in agricultural area of Western Africa (2.8 million ha and 1.7 million ha 
respectively), but an increase of nearly that much area in the rest of the world (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21  Difference in total land conversion from 2010-2050 compared to SSP2 (M ha) Note: 
negative values imply land savings compared to SSP2 
 
 
By 2050, nearly 5 % of the global forest area will be converted to agricultural land in SSP2, 
though policies in Western Africa that reduce the burden on land such as those in Self-
Determination can preserve the global forest area by nearly 2 million ha (half saved outside 
the region). In most of the scenarios, a larger share of agricultural land is converted from 
natural land than from forest in Western Africa, in the Save Yourself, the share of new 
agricultural area coming from forest is highest, leaving only 60% of the WA forests 
remaining in the future.  
Food Demand and Kilocalorie Availability  
Kilocalorie availability per capita per day is one of the indicators used to measure food 
security, which considers the total food products demanded by a region and translates the 
quantity of product to calories. Both models employ a double-log demand system to model 
consumer food demand, considering both a dynamic adjustment to demand based on income 
growth as well as a demand response based on prices (Valin et al., 2014). For this assessment, 
to limit the effects of food security to the socio-economic development rather than an 
underlying shift in dietary preferences, the income elasticities of demand were kept constant 
between the scenarios. As the income per capita increases over the time period in all 
scenarios, food demand, and kilocalories available, increase in the region (Figure 22). Self-
Determination sees the greatest improvement in food security due to the long-term 
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prospective and economic growth incorporates the supply chain from production, through 
technological improvements to close the yield gap, to market, through production costs. 
Cash, Control, Calories, with a relatively high increases in the GDP per capita and 
improvements in the agricultural production at the start of the period, sees an increase in the 
food security but the effects are limited due to the increases in production costs. When 
coupled with lack of investment in the regional food supply, the increase in production costs 
and conjointly consumer costs, due to the relative regional insecurity, the food security of the 
region remains a challenge. The SSP mirror of Save Yourself, SSP3, was also found to 
present challenges for the food security in Africa in other quantitative assessments. 
(Hasegawa et al., 2015). In terms of the diet composition, the scenarios with the highest 
economic growth and largest investment in livestock productivity, Cash, Control, Calories 
and Self-Determination, have the largest consumption of meat products. Civil Society to the 
Rescue? and Save Yourself have a larger increase in the per capita demand for cassava and 
other tubers than in the other scenarios, which follows with the socio-economic development 
of the scenarios, as cassava is a staple food crop typically consumed less with rising incomes.  
Figure 22  Kilocalorie availability per capita per day as modeled by GLOBIOM (circles) and IMPACT 
(squares) for West Africa CCAFS scenarios compared to SSP2 and indexed to year 2010 values 
 
Prices and Net Trade 
The regional price for crops increase over time for both Save Yourself and Civil Society to the 
Rescue? (+6% and +4% higher in 2050 than in 2010). By 2050, prices decrease in Cash, 
  55 
Control, Calories, although the early periods see an increase of nearly 5%, while Self-
Determination sees an overall decline over the entire time period.  
Dairy prices remain relatively stable and by 2050 decrease (-3%) in all the scenarios. 
Monogastrics meat, excluding eggs, increase the most in Save Yourself and Civil Society to 
the Rescue?, but the focus and investment in the monogastric industry in Cash, Control, 
Calories keeps the price from increasing as is seen in the other scenarios. Keeping producer 
input costs low and improvement in crop yields provide more feed for monogastrics in the 
Self-Determination scenario keeping the price from increasing more than 2% by 2050 despite 
the growing per capita demand which triples from 2010 to 2050.  
Despite the large share of production in region, in all the scenarios by 2050, cassava becomes 
imported, with imports equalling between 12% and 18% the production in the region. 
Cassava is primarily seen as a staple food crop and is consumed less as incomes rise, while it 
is also utilized as livestock feed making it an important crop due to a growing demand for 
meat products from rising income. It is no surprise then that among the scenarios the share of 
cassava used for livestock feed accounts for 68% of the demand for Self-Determination, due 
to growing incomes and meat demand, and only 26% for Save Yourself.  
Expressed as a share of the regional production, net imports of crop products by 2050 are as large as 
16%/29% (Cash, Control, Calories) and as little as 12%/22% (in Self-Determination) of the total crop 
production, in GLOBIOM and IMPACT respectively. Although GLOBIOM and IMPACT model 
results agree that imports of all livestock products increase in the region over time, there is no 
agreement in the scenario with the greatest imports as a share of regional production. 
Development Outside of Western Africa 
In all the scenarios by 2050, socioeconomic growth in rest of the world increases demand for 
and production of agricultural products increases 42% for crop products and 65% for 
livestock products. In 2010, South Asia, China, and South America were the largest 
consumers of crop products, but by 2050, South Asia and all of Africa will see the largest 
growth in demand for both crop and livestock products. South America (including Brazil) 
will become the largest producer for crop and livestock products, followed by South Asia. In 
terms of food security outside the region, kilocalorie consumption improves in nearly all 
regions, with India and the rest of South Asia calorie consumption increasing 15% and 23%, 
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and Eastern and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa calorie consumption increasing 31% to 37% 
by 2050.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Linking SSPs and CCAFS scenarios for improved regional context 
SSPs have been developed and are being quantified very well at the global scale due to the 
nature of the global modelling community. While the quantified socioeconomic storylines of 
the SSP have been provided at the national and sub-national level the scientific literature and 
insights into the regional developments has been lacking. This scenarios exercise as it is 
developed from stakeholder driven scenarios for the future of the region and linked with the 
global narratives of the SSPs offers one of the first globally consistent regional scenarios of 
the SSPs. As the CCAFS scenarios process continues more regional scenarios will be 
available for use by the policy making and research community alike.  
Diverse Scenarios are useful for developing robust climate policy that is 
scalable 
The two axis approach of the Eastern and Western Africa scenarios have diverse scenarios, 
while the multi-factor scenarios for SA, SEA, Andes, and CA use a scenario modelling tool 
to choose the most diverse scenarios (Mason-D’Croz et al. under revision.). Creating 
relatively few pathways, but representing widely different outcomes for socio-economic 
development, which is important for examining and using scenarios at different scales 
(Valdivia et al., 2015).  
The regional level is a key level at which to develop scenarios – because they are equivalent 
across scales while still relevant to regional economic bodies like ECOWAS and are easy to 
connect to global scenarios assessments (Zurek & Henrichs, 2007). Scenarios that provide a 
plausible development of the agricultural system provide appropriate and necessary inputs for 
more disaggregated impact assessment (Antle et al., 2015; Valdivia et al., 2015). 
Additionally, linking the scenarios between scales allows policy makers to address the issues 
within his or her decision context and its effect while leaving room at for others more 
aggregated or disaggregated scales to consider their decision context.  
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A primary purpose for the scenarios discussed in this paper is to use them for national and 
regional policy guidance (Vervoort et al., 2014). In such processes, a close collaboration with 
decision-makers results in the design of a process in which the regional scenarios are 
downscaled to the national level and to the concerns of a specific plan or policy. In an 
inclusive process that involves state and non-state actors, including those responsible for the 
policy and those who are most likely to be affected by it, the future scenarios offer multiple, 
challenging contexts in which to test draft plans and policies, providing recommendations for 
improved strategies which are then integrated. Examples of such use of the regional scenario 
are as follows:  
 In Burkina Faso, the West Africa scenarios were used to develop and test the 
country’s new National Plan for the Rural Sector for Burkina Faso (PNSR) and to 
identify research priorities needed to help the plan succeed (see Chapter 3 and 
https://ccafs.cgiar.org/blog/using-future-scenarios-design-policy-and-research-
together-burkina-faso#.VfF4shGqpBd). The quantified CCAFS scenarios were useful 
for adding regional context to the country level scenarios developed by drafters of the 
PNSR.  
 The CCAFS scenarios have helped guide and inform national and subnational level 
policy processes in Ghana (see Chapter 3 and https://ccafs.cgiar.org/blog/scenarios-
help-guide-discussions-what-ghana%E2%80%99s-future-could-
look#.VfF4ZRGqpBd)  
 Informed by these national-level processes, a collaboration with ECOWAS and other 
research partners has been set up to use the regional scenarios for ECOWAS-level 
priority setting, notably with the current process of new reshape of the ECOWAS 
common agricultural policy to meet the new challenges facing West Africa 
agriculture (ECOWAP+10).  
Trade-offs at the regional level  
Investments directed at improving agricultural yields of crops and livestock may lead to 
additional conversion of area used by agriculture within the region, but the without 
significant productivity gains, agricultural area will expand within the region through 
extensification, or outside the region through compensating land use change.  
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Although the increased profitability of yield improving technologies and increased market 
access that reduces production costs in agriculture may increase the expansion of area under 
agriculture, the effects of land use change must be examined in the context of global land use 
change. Technologies that improve the returns to land in Western Africa and increase 
region’s competitiveness within Africa may reduce potential land use change. 
Although the agricultural sector faces low crop yields, the region produces and will continue 
to produce a significant share of the global production for a selection of crops. Large shares 
of these crops are consumed within the region, but trade in these crops continues to be 
important in the future. Cassava is presently a staple food crop in the region and will continue 
to serve as a vital crop for the region, both for food consumption and, under changing diet 
preferences due to increasing incomes, as livestock feed. Even when strides are made to 
improve productivity, the region’s agricultural sector cannot keep up with the growing 
regional and global demands, and for many crops, competitiveness declines and the region 
sees an increased share of imports relative to the region’s overall production, cassava 
included.  
Climate change is likely to have a negative effect on both crop yields and grassland 
productivity, and the lack of investment in crop productivity may exacerbate the challenges 
of climate change. Since the region that has historically seen production growth through 
expansion of cropland area rather than through yield improvements, this is troublesome.  
Food security poses a challenge in the future where population grows rapidly and economic 
growth does not keep up. In the scenarios, long term priority setting that focuses on economic 
growth increases the food availability, however, the quantitative models are not yet equipped 
to model income inequality equity or urban and rural poverty.  
Quantification of scenarios through modelling builds consistency of scenarios 
The quantified scenarios offer the opportunity to reflect on the potential agricultural, food 
security, and climate futures of the ECOWAS region as well as its socio-economic 
developments. By providing multiple narratives and quantitative assessments of plausible 
futures based around the SSPs, when taken together provide a meso-scale representative 
agricultural pathways (RAPs) which can be disaggregated and downscaled for other 
subregional, national and subnational assessments (Kihara et al., 2015; Valdivia et al., 2015). 
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GLOBIOM and IMPACT do not attempt to provide forecasts; but instead, they provide a 
diverse set of futures, with the understanding that multi-dimensional challenges such as 
climate change are highly unpredictable. Scenarios gain credibility and become more relevant 
to the local realities by involving stakeholders at multiple levels, and the quantification of 
scenarios using models gives credibility and consistency to the scenarios by using data and 
consistent representations of different agricultural systems and considering the future 
development for the rest of the word. By providing insights to how the region will be affected 
by forces outside its control, such as global markets and climate change, the scenarios benefit 
from quantification by identifying the profound effects these influences have on regional 
outcomes.  
Some of the semi-quantitative indicators fell outside the scope of the applicability for the 
quantitative modelling, such as indicators regarding equity, health, and human services, while 
others could not be used as a model drivers because they were endogenous model results. It is 
useful to examine these modelling results through the lens of the semi-quantitative indicators. 
Forest cover and cropland expansion are two such indicators. The quantification by the 
models does not include policies and enforcement to protect areas from deforestation, and 
under these conditions, the scenarios with the least regional deforestation are those with the 
highest crop yield growth, while the semi-quantitative indicators suggest that the scenarios 
with the least regional deforestation will be due to the activities from the civil society. 
Exploring how these policies would look within a modelling exercise may provide a useful 
tool for policy makers. 
Limitations of Modelling 
However, using existing quantitative models also has drawbacks in the fact that the models 
have been designed based on the present rather than qualitatively different futures, and 
therefore there are limits with regard to the degree to which models can capture these futures. 
Also, quantitative scenarios of the future can easily and wrongfully be interpreted as forecasts 
with predictive value. Therefore, the presentation of quantitative results from the CCAFS 
scenarios process involves highlighting the limitations and assumptions of the models and 
shows that depending on the model as well as the scenario, very different futures arise.   
  60 
References 
Absar, S. M., & Preston, B. L. (2015). Extending the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways for sub-
national impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability studies. Global Environmental Change, 33, 83–
96. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.04.004 
Alcott, B. (2005). Jevons’ paradox. Ecological Economics, 54(1), 9–21. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.03.020 
Antle, J. M., Stoorvogel, J. J., Valdivia, R. O., & B, P. T. R. S. (2014). New parsimonious simulation 
methods and tools to assess future food and environmental security of farm populations New 
parsimonious simulation methods and tools to assess future food and environmental security of 
farm populations, (February). 
Antle, J. M., Valdivia, R. O., Boote, K. J., Janssen, S., Jones, J. W., Porter, C. H., … Thorburn, P. J. 
(2015). AgMIP’s Transdisciplinary Agricultural Systems Approach to Regional Integrated 
Assessment of Climate Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation. In C. Rosenzweig & D. Hillel 
(Eds.), Handbook of Climate Change and Agroecosystems (pp. 27–44). Joint Publication with 
American Society of Agronomy, Crop Science Society of America, and Soil Science Society of 
America. http://doi.org/10.1142/9781783265640_0002 
Baldos, U. L. C., & Hertel, T. W. (2015). The role of international trade in managing food security 
risks from climate change. Food Security, 7(2), 275–290. http://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-015-
0435-z 
Byerlee, D., Stevenson, J., & Villoria, N. (2014). Does intensification slow crop land expansion or 
encourage deforestation? Global Food Security, 3(2), 92–98. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2014.04.001 
Crespo Cuaresma, J. (2015). Income projections for climate change research: A framework based on 
human capital dynamics. Global Environmental Change. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.012 
Dellink, R., Chateau, J., Lanzi, E., & Magné, B. (2015). Long-term economic growth projections in 
the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. Global Environmental Change. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.06.004 
Dijk, M. Van. (2011). African Regional Integration : Implications for Food Security, 1–29. 
Ericksen, P.J., Ingram, J.S.I., Liverman, D.M. (2009). Food security and global environmental 
change: emerging challenges. Environmental Science and Policy 12(4): 373-377 
Fanta, E., Shaw, T. M., & Tang, V. T. (2013). Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the 21st 
Century: Insights from the Global South. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.at/books/about/Comparative_Regionalisms_for_Development.html?id=ykC
YMQEACAAJ&pgis=1 
  61 
Fischer, T., Byerlee, D., & Edmeades, G. (2014). Crop yields and global food security: Will yield 
increase continue to feed the world? ACIAR Monograph, (158), 634. http://doi.org/978 1 925133 
06 6 
Gourichon, H. (2013). Analysis of incentives and disincentives for sorghum in Nigeria. Technical 
Note Series, MAFAP. Rome. 
Hachigonta, Sepo, E., Nelson, Gerald C., E., Thomas, Timothy S., E., & Sibanda, Lindiwe M., E. 
(2013). Southern African agriculture and climate change A comprehensive analysis. Washington 
D.C. Retrieved from http://www.ifpri.org/publication/southern-african-agriculture-and-climate-
change 
Hasegawa, T., Fujimori, S., Takahashi, K., & Masui, T. (2015). Scenarios for the risk of hunger in the 
twenty-first century using Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. Environmental Research Letters, 
10(1), 014010. http://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/1/014010 
Havlík, P., Leclère, D., Valin, H., Herrero, M., Schmid, E., Jean-Francois Soussana, C. M., & 
Obersteiner, M. (2015). Climate change and food systems: global assessments and implications 
for food security and trade. In A. Elbehri (Ed.), (pp. 176–208). Food Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO). 
Havlik, P., Valin, H., Herrero, M., Obersteiner, M., Schmid, E., Rufino, M. C., … Notenbaert, A. 
(2014). Climate change mitigation through livestock system transitions. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 111(10), 3709–3714. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1308044111 
Havlík, P., Valin, H., Herrero, M., Obersteiner, M., Schmid, E., Rufino, M. C., … Notenbaert, A. 
(2014). Climate change mitigation through livestock system transitions. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111(10), 3709–14. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1308044111 
Helfgott, A., Sova, C., Thorn, J., Chaudhury, A., Bailey, M., Vervoort, J.M., Ademiluyi, A., Van de 
Grift, E. (2014). Multi-level Integrated Adaptation Governance Ghana - Workshop Report. 
CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). 
Herrero, M., Havlik, P., McIntire, J. M., Palazzo, A., & Valin, H. (2014). African Livestock Futures: 
Realizing the Potential of Livestock for Food Security, Poverty Reduction and the Environment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Geneva, Switzerland. 
Hillocks, R. J. (2002). Cassava in Africa. In Cassava: biology, production and utilization (pp. 41–54). 
http://doi.org/10.1079/9780851995243.0041 
Jalloh, A., Nelson, G. C., Thomas, T. S., Zougmoré, R., & Roy-Macauley, H. (2013). West African 
Agriculture and Climate Change: A comprehensive analysis. Washington, D.C.: International 
Food Policy Research Institute. http://doi.org/10.2499/9780896292048 
Jiang, L., & O’Neill, B. C. (2015). Global urbanization projections for the Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways. Global Environmental Change. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.03.008 
  62 
Kamuanga, M. J. B., Somada, J., Sanon, Y., & Kagoné, H. (2008). OECD Report: Livestock and 
regional market in the Sahel and West Africa Potentials and challenges. OECD. 
KC, S., & Lutz, W. (2014). The human core of the shared socioeconomic pathways: Population 
scenarios by age, sex and level of education for all countries to 2100. Global Environmental 
Change. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.06.004 
Kihara, J., MacCarthy, D. S., Bationo, A., Koala, S., Hickman, J., Koo, J., … Jones, J. W. (2015). 
Perspectives on Climate Effects on Agriculture: The International Efforts of AgMIP in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In C. Rosenzweig & D. Hillel (Eds.), Handbook of Climate Change and 
Agroecosystems (Vol. 3, pp. 3–23). Joint Publication with American Society of Agronomy, Crop 
Science Society of America, and Soil Science Society of America. 
http://doi.org/10.1142/9781783265640_0013 
Leclère, D., Havlík, P., Fuss, S., Schmid, E., Mosnier, A., Walsh, B., … Obersteiner, M. (2014). 
Climate change induced transformations of agricultural systems: insights from a global model. 
Environmental Research Letters, 9(12), 124018. http://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/9/12/124018 
Leimbach, M., Kriegler, E., Roming, N., & Schwanitz, J. (2015). Future growth patterns of world 
regions – A GDP scenario approach. Global Environmental Change. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.005 
Lotze-Campen, H., von Lampe, M., Kyle, P., Fujimori, S., Havlik, P., van Meijl, H., … Wise, M. 
(2014). Impacts of increased bioenergy demand on global food markets: an AgMIP economic 
model intercomparison. Agricultural Economics, 45(1), 103–116. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12092 
Millenium Ecosystems Assessment (2005). Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. 
Island Press, Washington, DC. 
Mosnier, A., Obersteiner, M., Havlík, P., Schmid, E., Khabarov, N., Westphal, M., … Albrecht, F. 
(2014). Global food markets, trade and the cost of climate change adaptation. Food Security, 
6(1), 29–44. http://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-013-0319-z 
Müller, C. (2011). Agriculture: Harvesting from uncertainties. Nature Climate Change, 1(5), 253–
254. http://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1179 
Müller, C., Cramer, W., Hare, W. L., & Lotze-Campen, H. (2011). Climate change risks for African 
agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
108(11), 4313–4315. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1015078108 
Müller, C., & Robertson, R. D. (2014). Projecting future crop productivity for global economic 
modeling. Agricultural Economics, 45(1), 37–50. http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12088 
Nakicenovic, N., Alcamo, J., Davis, G., de Vries, B., Fenhann, J., Gaffin, S., … Dadi, Z. (2000). 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios : a special report of Working Group III of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Other Information: PBD: 3 Oct 2000 (Vol. New 
  63 
York, ). Retrieved from http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/15009867-
Kv00FB/native/ 
Nelson, G. C., Rosegrant, M. W., Palazzo, A., Gray, I., Ingersoll, C., Robertson, R., … Zhu, T. 
(2010). Food Security, Farming, and Climate Change to 2050: Scenarios, Results, Policy 
Options. Research reports IFPRI. International Food Policy Research Institute. 
http://doi.org/10.2499/9780896291867 
Nelson, G. C., & Shively, G. E. (2014). Modeling climate change and agriculture: an introduction to 
the special issue. Agricultural Economics, 45(1), 1–2. http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12093 
Nelson, G. C., Valin, H., Sands, R. D., Havlík, P., Ahammad, H., Deryng, D., … Willenbockel, D. 
(2014). Climate change effects on agriculture: economic responses to biophysical shocks. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111(9), 3274–
9. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1222465110 
Nelson, G. C., van der Mensbrugghe, D., Ahammad, H., Blanc, E., Calvin, K., Hasegawa, T., … 
Willenbockel, D. (2014). Agriculture and climate change in global scenarios: why don’t the 
models agree. Agricultural Economics, 45(1), 85–101. http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12091 
O’Neill, B. C., Kriegler, E., Ebi, K. L., Kemp-benedict, E., & Riahi, K. (2015). The Roads Ahead : 
Narratives for Shared Socioeconomic Pathways describing World Futures in the 21 st Century. 
Global Environmental Change, 1–48. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.004 
O’Neill, B. C., Kriegler, E., Ebi, K. L., Kemp-Benedict, E., Riahi, K., Rothman, D. S., … Solecki, W. 
(2015). The roads ahead: Narratives for shared socioeconomic pathways describing world 
futures in the 21st century. Global Environmental Change. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.004 
O’Neill, B. C., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Ebi, K. L., Hallegatte, S., Carter, T. R., … van Vuuren, D. P. 
(2014). A new scenario framework for climate change research: the concept of shared 
socioeconomic pathways. Climatic Change, 122(3), 387–400. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-
013-0905-2 
Palazzo, A., Vervoort, J., Havlik, P., Mason-D ’croz, D., & Islam, S. (2014). Simulating stakeholder- 
driven food and climate scenarios for policy development in Africa, Asia and Latin America: A 
multi-regional synthesis CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security (CCAFS), (109). 
Robinson, S., Mason-D’Croz, D., Islam, S., Sulser, T. B., Robertson, R., Zhu, T., … Technology, E. 
and P. (2015). The International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and 
Trade (IMPACT) Model Description for Version 3 (IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 1483). 
Washington D.C. Retrieved from 
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/129825/filename/130036.pdf 
Robinson, S., van Meijl, H., Willenbockel, D., Valin, H., Fujimori, S., Masui, T., … von Lampe, M. 
  64 
(2014). Comparing supply-side specifications in models of global agriculture and the food 
system. Agricultural Economics (United Kingdom), 45(1), 21–35. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12087 
Rohrbach, D., Minde, I., & Howard, J. (2003). Looking beyond national boundaries: regional 
harmonization of seed policies, laws and regulations. Food Policy, 28(4), 317–333. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2003.08.005 
Roudier, P., Sultan, B., Quirion, P., & Berg, A. (2011). The impact of future climate change on West 
African crop yields: What does the recent literature say? Global Environmental Change, 21(3), 
1073–1083. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.04.007 
Rutting, L., Zougmoré, R., Vervoort, J.M., Balinga, M., Ouédraogo, M., Rabdo, A., Zida, M. (2015). 
Scenario-guided review of the Program National du Secteur Rural (PNSR) of Burkina Faso - 
Workshop Report. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security 
(CCAFS). 
Schmitz, C., van Meijl, H., Kyle, P., Nelson, G. C., Fujimori, S., Gurgel, A., … Valin, H. (2014). 
Land-use change trajectories up to 2050: Insights from a global agro-economic model 
comparison. Agricultural Economics (United Kingdom), 45(1), 69–84. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12090 
Schweizer, V. J., & O’Neill, B. C. (2013). Systematic construction of global socioeconomic pathways 
using internally consistent element combinations. Climatic Change, 122(3), 431–445. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0908-z 
Service, B. F., Division, T., Division, P., & Pradesh, A. (1996). The World Sorghum and Millet 
Economies : Facts, Trends and Outlook. Outlook, 2–5. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com/books?id=OrMCxUHJXqwC&pgis=1 
Sietz, D., & Van Dijk, H. (2015). Land-based adaptation to global change: What drives soil and water 
conservation in western Africa? Global Environmental Change, 33, 131–141. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.05.001 
Stevenson, J. R., Villoria, N., Byerlee, D., Kelley, T., & Maredia, M. (2013). Green Revolution 
research saved an estimated 18 to 27 million hectares from being brought into agricultural 
production. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
110(21), 8363–8. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208065110 
Sultan, B., Roudier, P., Quirion, P., Alhassane, a, Muller, B., Dingkuhn, M., … Baron, C. (2013). 
Assessing climate change impacts on sorghum and millet yields in the Sudanian and Sahelian 
savannas of West Africa. Environmental Research Letters, 8(1), 014040. 
http://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/014040 
UNCTAD. (2012). Structural Transformation and Sustainable Development in Africa. 
United Nations. (2009). Economic Development in Africa Report 2009. 
  65 
Valdivia, R. O., Antle, J. M., Rosenzweig, C., Ruane, A. C., Vervoort, J., Ashfaq, M., … Singh, H. 
(2015). Representative Agricultural Pathways and Scenarios for Regional Integrated Assessment 
of Climate Change Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation. In C. Rosenzweig & D. Hillel (Eds.), 
Handbook of Climate Change and Agroecosystems (pp. 101–145). Joint Publication with 
American Society of Agronomy, Crop Science Society of America, and Soil Science Society of 
America. http://doi.org/10.1142/9781783265640_0005 
Valin, H., Sands, R. D., van der Mensbrugghe, D., Nelson, G. C., Ahammad, H., Blanc, E., … 
Willenbockel, D. (2014). The future of food demand: understanding differences in global 
economic models. Agricultural Economics, 45(1), 51–67. http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12089 
Van Ruijven, B. J., Levy, M. a., Agrawal, A., Biermann, F., Birkmann, J., Carter, T. R., … Schweizer, 
V. J. (2014). Enhancing the relevance of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways for climate change 
impacts, adaptation and vulnerability research. Climatic Change, 122(3), 481–494. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0931-0 
Van Vuuren, D. P., & Carter, T. R. (2013). Climate and socio-economic scenarios for climate change 
research and assessment: reconciling the new with the old. Climatic Change, 122(3), 415–429. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0974-2 
Van Vuuren, D. P., Kok, M.T.J., Girod, B., Lucas, P.L., de Vries, B. (2012). Scenarios in global 
environmental assessments: key characteristics and lessons for future use. Global Environmental 
Change, 22: 884-895 
Van Vuuren, D. P., Kriegler, E., O’Neill, B. C., Ebi, K. L., Riahi, K., Carter, T. R., … Winkler, H. 
(2013). A new scenario framework for Climate Change Research: scenario matrix architecture. 
Climatic Change, 122(3), 373–386. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0906-1 
Vermeulen, S., Zougmore, R., Wollenberg, E., Thornton, P., Nelson, G.C., Kristjanson, P., Kinyangi, 
J., Jarvis, A., Hansen, J., Challinor, A., Campbell, B., Aggarwal, P. (2012). Climate change, 
agriculture and food security: A global partnership to link research and action for low-income 
agricultural producers and consumers. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 4(1): 
128-133 
Vervoort, J. M., Palazzo, A., Mason-D’Croz, D., Ericksen, P. J., Thornton, P. K., Kristjanson, P., … 
Rowlands, H. (2013). The future of food security, environments and livelihoods in Eastern 
Africa: four socio-economic scenarios. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security Working Report, (63). 
Vervoort, J. M., Thornton, P. K., Kristjanson, P., Förch, W., Ericksen, P. J., Kok, K., … Jost, C. 
(2014). Challenges to scenario-guided adaptive action on food security under climate change. 
Global Environmental Change, 28, 383–394. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.03.001 
von Lampe, M., Willenbockel, D., Ahammad, H., Blanc, E., Cai, Y., Calvin, K., … van Meijl, H. 
(2014). Why do global long-term scenarios for agriculture differ? An overview of the AgMIP 
Global Economic Model Intercomparison. Agricultural Economics, 45(1), 3–20. 
  66 
http://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12086 
Waithaka, Michael, E., Nelson, Gerald C., E., Thomas, Timothy S., E., & Kyotalimye, Miriam, E. 
(2013). East African agriculture and climate change A comprehensive analysis. 
Wheeler, T., & Reynolds, C. (2012). Predicting the risks from climate change to forage and crop 
production for animal feed. Animal Frontiers, 3(1), 36–41. http://doi.org/10.2527/af.2013-0006 
Wilbanks, T. J., & Ebi, K. L. (2013). SSPs from an impact and adaptation perspective. Climatic 
Change, 122(3), 473–479. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0903-4 
Zurek, M. B., & Henrichs, T. (2007). Linking scenarios across geographical scales in international 
environmental assessments. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 74(8), 1282–1295. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2006.11.005 
 
  
  67 
Appendix A: Workshop participants 
 
Name Organization/function Country 
ANGE Alain Louis FARA Ghana 
AUBEE Ernest Principal Programme Officer, 
Agriculture 
Nigeria 
BAYALA Jules ECOWAS Commission Mali 
BEND Pauline ICRAF WAC - Sahel Node Senegal 
CHAUDHURY Moushumi PANOS INSTITUTE Kenya 
COLY Adrien CGIAR Senegal 
DAN Vincent CLUVA Senegal 
DIAGNE Serigne Conference interpreter Senegal 
DIARRA Niambelé Animata Conference interpreter Mali 
DIOP Helène Diouf Direction Nationale de l'Agriculture 
du Mali (Afrique de 
l'Ouest) 
Senegal 
DIOP Mamadou ASFED Senegal 
AFESEY Kodjo Ekpé Delight PROGEBE Senegal 
ERICKSEN Polly Conference interpreter Kenya 
FAYE Abdourahmane ILRI Senegal 
FAYE Mbène Dièye Chef du BFPA du Ministère de 
l'Agriculture 
Senegal 
FAYE Ndèye Fatou CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
FAYINKEH Mahamadou Enda Energy The Gambia 
HANE Libasse NACOFAG Senegal 
INGRAM John University of Oxford - facilitation UK 
KADI KADI Hame Abdou NERC Niger 
KARBO Naaminong INRAN/ CSIR-ARI Ghana 
KOURESSY Mamoutou CSIR-ARI Mali 
LO Ndeye Khady l'IER/Sotuba Senegal 
MOUDY MAMANE Sani CORAF/WECARD Niger 
MULLER Bertrand Conseiller Technique du Ministre 
de l'Agriculture du 
Niger, CIRAD 
Senegal 
MWIKYA John CIRAD - AfricaRice-ISRA-
CERAAS 
Niger 
NDIAYE Cécile Edith ACMAD Senegal 
NDIAYE Ousmane CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
NUTSUKPO Delali Kofi Ministry of Food and Agriculture Ghana 
OFEI-NKANSAH Kingsley Ministry of Food and Agriculture Ghana 
OUALBIOGO Vie Hermann General Agricultural Workers' 
Union 
Senegal 
PARKOUDA Sibri Dominique 
Vincent 
Conference interpreter Burkina Faso 
SAWADOGO Alfred SP/CPSA Burkina Faso 
SECK Emmanuel SOS Senegal 
SEGDA Zenabou ENDA Burkina Faso 
SENGHOR Abdoulaye Independent Consultant Burkina Faso 
SOGOBA Bougouna CEPAPE Mali 
SOME Léopold ONG AMEDD Burkina Faso 
  68 
TRAORE Pierre C. Sibiry INERA Mali 
VERVOORT Joost University of Oxford, CCAFS UK 
SECK Marianne CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
ZOUGMORE Robert ICRISAT Mali 
ADAMOU BAYE Issoufa INRAN Niger 
AGALYOU Alkassoum Institutionnel de la Gestion des 
Questions Environnementales 
Mali 
 
AINSLIE Andrew University of Oxford - facilitation UK 
ANGE Alain Louis FARA Ghana 
BADJECK Marie Caroline WorldFish Centre Malaysia 
BENINATI Noel ICRISAT Niger 
ONILLA-FINDJI Osana CIAT Colombia 
COULIBALY Mamadou SAHEL ECO/CNOP Mali 
CRAUFURD Peter ICRISAT India 
DIA Alassane CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
DIAO BA Maty AGRHYMET Niger 
DIARRA Daouda Zan Nationale de la Météorologie Mali 
DIOP Chérif Nationale de la Météorologie Senegal 
DIOP Mamadou PROGEBE Senegal 
ERICKSEN Polly ILRI Kenya 
GAYE Amadou Thierno LPAOSF/ESP Senegal 
HANSEN James International Research Institute for 
Climate and Society - Facilitation 
USA 
HAROUNA NIANDOU Abdel Mercy Corsp Niger 
HASSANE Yaye Agroeconomist indépendant Niger 
JALLOH Abdulai CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
KADI KADI Hame Abdou INRAN Niger 
KAGONE Hamade CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
KONE Anatole Yekeminan CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
KOUAME Nama Justin CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
KOURESSY Mamoutou l'Unité Agroclimatologie de 
l'IER/Sotuba 
Mali 
KRISTJANSON Patti ICRAF Kenya 
KUISEU Julienne CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
MARIKO Dramane USAID Senegal 
MBOUP Papa Interprète de conférences Senegal 
NDIAYE Cécile Edith CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
NDIAYE Ousmane IRI Columbia University USA 
NDOUR Ndeye Yacine ISRA Senegal 
OUEDRAOGO Sibiri Jean PRA/SA-LCD-Pop Dev Burkina Faso 
ROY-MACAULEY Harold CORAF/WECARD Senegal 
SCHWEDERSKY Thomas Process Facilitator Germany 
SISSOKO Keffing INSAH Mali 
SOGOBA Bougouma ONG AMEDD Mali 
SOME Leopold INERA Burkina Faso 
SOUMARE Mamy ICRISAT Mali 
THIAM Ibrahima Interprète de conférences Senegal 
TRAORE Famouke TOURE Mali 
VERMEULEN Sonja CCAFS Denmark 
WOLLENBERG Lini University of VERMONT USA 
  
  69 
Appendix B: Narratives of the Western Africa Scenarios 
Cash, Control, Calories  
Figure A1  Conceptual map developed by workshop participants on the key elements and 
relationships in the scenario. 
 
 
Socio-economic context: looking for quick fixes in uncertain times 
West Africa in the 2010s and early 2020s has been characterized by political instability and 
extractive economic activity by actors from outside the region. Significant population growth 
and urbanisation have driven food, energy and livelihood needs. A weak regional private 
sector has meant that a push for developments has been left to governments, largely working 
with outside actors – and these governments have been looking for quick fixes, and their 
precursors, fast cash. To this end, land privatization and long-term leases have been set up 
that mostly benefit foreign and urban interests; non-food imports have been stimulated, and 
water taxation has been employed. Governments have struggled to quell violence and crime 
connected to religion and drug trafficking in the region that saw a rise in the mid-2010s. 
Those seeking a safe haven under the shelter of disorder found it in West Africa. These is a 
looming energy crisis, driven both by a lack of local fuel wood availability and global oil 
scarcity.  
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Governments took the role of “protector states”, albeit with limited resources, and prefer 
national sovereignty and concerns over regional integration. These governments also tended 
to be reactive to issues of rural poverty and food security and environmental concerns – their 
focus has been on quick economic development. Local resource mining has been 
aggressively pursued through widespread land use conversion (deforestation) for quick food 
and fuel. Governments were more concerned with urban stability than with rural livelihoods. 
In the 2010s, political instability in Azawad affected stability of the entire region; a second 
failure of Libyan government exacerbated this problem and so far no resolution has been 
reached. In 2025, violent political unrest and crime in Nigeria reached the levels where 
Nigeria was seen as a “failed state”, further confounding regional attempt to create durably 
stable conditions for economic activity. The failure of Nigeria has contributed to brutal 
monetary shocks that affected competitiveness of West African economies and further drove 
urbanisation.  
Water conflicts between neighboring countries over the Volta and Niger River basins and 
between urban and rural populations within countries (the Bani river basin) as growth in 
demand cannot be managed (coming from irrigation, human consumption and hydro power).  
Access to knowledge, technology and trade regulates tensions and interactions between 
governments and non-government actors. Governments’ capacity to attract outside funding 
has grown, despite regional instability. There is a strong and successful focus on improving 
energy supplies.  
By the late 2020, as resources have become scarce, governments have adopted policies of 
tactical entrenchment rather than further development, reacting to crises as necessary. 
 
From 2030 to 2050: Post-2030, remedial action is initiated through social negotiation, under 
impulse from NGOs, CSOs with ECOWAS backing (20-year learning cycle).  
Agriculture and food security: hectares = cash = peace 
 
Food security in West Africa by 2030 has seen a relative increase overall, but this increase 
hides large spatial and temporal instability. The lack of conservation and environmental 
policy means that agricultural expansion and intensification as well as other types of 
expanding land use threaten agro-ecosystems and agro-biodiversity (though not necessarily in 
highly populated areas). Subsistence systems that were relatively resilient in the 2010s have 
struggled to cope with significantly higher demand in the 2020s.  
Governments stimulated large-scale agricultural production, emphasizing quantity over 
quality. Policies’ emphasis on urban/foreign driven “monoculture” progressively seals off 
transhumant corridors leading to conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists 
(exacerbated by deforestation) 
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GMOs are now legal in most West African Countries, since 2021. States have taken a pro-
active, interventionist stance to resolve the food security problem using easiest mechanisms 
available: global biotechnology and local legislative power. States favored involvement of 
multinational giants to kick-start the commercial seed sector, yet faced powerful counter-
actions from dynamic farmers’ unions requiring lobbying and negotiations on both sides 
throughout the 2020s. The outcome of this is that farmer unions have just struck a deal with 
Monsanto on sorghum hybrids in 2030. Rice imports from Asia hit an all-time high in the 
early 2020s. Food security targets require immediate procurement of staples with rice being 
cheaper on international markets, and local trade operators being a “quick and dirty” 
mechanism to meet the growing demand, particularly from growing urban areas.  
The quick push for and achievement of crop productivity increase on average is associated 
with lower yield stability, more vulnerability from reliance on non-seed buffer mechanisms, 
and conflicts over seed with commercial seed systems 
A phyto-sanitary crisis in 2015 exacerbates the dependence on external solutions for food. 
The need for external safety nets exists at all levels, including for urban to rural cash flows. 
Governments’ increased capacity to attract outside funding and aid flows has contributed to 
food security and helped mitigate some of the worst impacts of inequality of food access, but 
food aid dependence also slowed down development.  
West Africa harbors abundant water reserves both on surface and underground, largely 
untapped, and returns on investments are highest in irrigated agriculture in the short term. 
States mobilized resources and tools for both large-scale and small-scale irrigation schemes. 
As a result, irrigated cropland has doubled in 20 years. 
By 2030, the rapid growth in food and fuel demand driven by population increase, 
particularly urban has led to rapid cropland expansion and fuelwood exploitation in Sudanian 
and Guinean agro-ecologies home to the last dry forests for West Africa. There has been little 
incentive to preserve protected areas for the longer term and preference is given to agro-
forestry, mixed, intensified systems. 
 
Livelihoods and well-being: inequality grows 
From the 2010s to the 2030s, an overarching trend in West Africa has been that problems that 
threaten well-being have been dealt with only after they became apparent. Structural 
problems of inequality remain unaddressed while governments scrambled to raise GDP. GDP 
development has inevitably led to some trickle-down effects for vulnerable groups in the 
region but these benefits have been minimal and unreliable. In fact, social and geographical 
inequalities in access to resources (finance, education, government support) have grown. In 
particular, the rural/urban divide is strengthened by the inequitable sharing of benefits from 
economic development, such as the crowding out of smallholder farmers. 
  72 
Governments have had limited capacity and interest in fostering structural changes to lead to 
better education. Some effort has been put into reaching MDGs through short-term 
investments in the 2010s and a plan for the decentralization of education organization had 
been initiated but the need for resources to address security concerns trumped these plans.  
Though access to health care for the middle and upper classes grows with the push for 
economic development in a narrow sense, little effort is put into health care improvement for 
the most vulnerable groups. Because of a lack of investment in education, the knowledge and 
skills needed for widespread, easily accessible health care are lacking. Where available, the 
quality of health care is questionable. Issues of shame predominate around disease and are 
not resolved through education. Sanitation issues arise due to increasing populations and 
contribute to the health problems of vulnerable communities.  
The freedom of CSOs and NGOs to help vulnerable communities attain better livelihoods and 
well-beings has been curtailed by strict control-focused governments.  
Crime is a problem for many vulnerable communities. Governments crack down on criminal 
activity but have not been able to deal with structural issues driving the growth of crime.  
Some makeshift policies exist around social protection schemes but these have proven to be 
unreliable, badly implemented and largely cosmetic. 
Overall, government actions to combat poverty are driven by political demand but though 
short-term, highly visible successes are achieved to win political good-will, these do not 
solve longer-term problems. No structural investments are made. 
 
Environments:  
Because governments in West Africa are primarily interested in narrow economic 
development and increasing food security in a very basic, productionist way, environments 
are badly affected.  
Governments’ ability to leverage the efforts of outside investors in land has meant the loss of 
natural environments. Land degradation has proceeded rapidly. As a result, biodiversity loss 
has been high as well. Dryland forests have been particularly severely affected.  
Any government policies on environmental governance are largely cosmetic and are not 
implemented as such.  
Marine biodiversity has also suffered because of massive fishing. There is algal biofuel 
production on the continental shelf – this activity, while producing energy, has also reduced 
marine biodiversity.  
Pressures on water resources have further degraded natural environments.  
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Self-Determination 
 
Figure A2  Main elements and relationships of the Self-Determination scenario. 
Socio-economic context: together, slowly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 2010s, West African countries worked together to overcome regional instability in 
Mali and elsewhere. Investment policies in rural infrastructure, food security and agriculture 
and security competed for funds. Security (costly and unpredictable) and infrastructure 
development (high maintenance costs) proved to the main areas of government expenditure 
up to the mid 2010s. Toward 2020, governance conditions and infrastructure started to 
improve and GDP increased faster (partly due to mineral exports and increasing revenues 
from services), and investments in regional food security went up, as did policies to improve 
the livelihoods of the rural poor through services and education. The 2020s were 
characterized by financial and institutional integration. A second monetary union of English 
speaking countries was created by 2020 and later merged with ECOWAS in a union with a 
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common currency by 2030. Governments took the lead in economic development by inviting 
non-state actors in good and competitive funding schemes. Private small credit schemes were 
available to help boost small and medium enterprises, including the agricultural sector.  
 
From the early 2020s on, states took an increasingly directive role in regulating local and 
regional markets including transport infrastructure. This changing role was drive stronger 
local governance due to real decentralization from the national level combined with 
harmonization at the regional level that took place by 2020. Subsidies were provided by the 
state for the production while private small schemes for credit were available for product 
processing, transport and commercialization. As national governments became more 
accountable to local authorities, regional organizations like CILSS and ECOWAS also 
became more accountable to countries and that led to the signature of an intra-regional 
trade/self-sufficiency policy with strong focus on sustainability of production systems.  
 
A key component of new regional agreements involved the development of solar energy and 
hydropower to support the development in transport and industrial production chains. River 
Basin Organizations are successful in achieving tangible development goals, particularly in 
the hydropower subsector. Hydro energetic capacities of West Africa increased by 35%, 
though this success was marred by the regional disputes that the question ownership of this 
energy produced. At national scale, West African governments achieved a strong shift in 
institutional mind-sets with core ministries (energy, water, agriculture and environment) 
putting in place the right coordination mechanisms to tackle sustainable rural and agriculture 
development, to reduce deforestation and enhance food security in a single integrated agenda. 
Carbon sequestered from good agricultural practices was priced at 30 USD per ton leading to 
the removal of energy taxes and thus making energy cheaper and more accessible to larger 
proportion of the population. The 2020s did see difficulties to reduce transport costs, despite 
the availability of new infrastructure, due to the challenge of implementing successful inter-
state conventions and regional policies on the free movement of persons, good and services, 
resulting in high costs for police, customs and gendarmerie checkpoints.  
 
From 2030 to 2050: 
 
Agriculture and food security: self-sufficient and nutritious 
 
In the early 2010s, one third of the children under five years of age in West Africa were 
stunted due to micronutrient deficiencies, particularly lack of vitamin A, iron and iodine 
leading to high mortality rate of these children (220 deaths per 1000 live births). Overweight 
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and obesity were emerging problems in some urban populations and chronic energy 
deficiency affected 7-20% of women of West African region. 
 
Boosted by greater political stability that allowed for higher GDP growth in the late 2010s, 
technologies for the fortification and improved breeding of key staple foods such as rice, 
maize and sorghum as well as yam, cassava and sweet potato were more effectively 
implemented because of harmonized policies at the regional level. In addition, food-based 
interventions were geared to natural food, better processing procedures including fortification 
processes to overcome and prevent malnutrition. All these actions contributed to 
improvements in physiological, mental and social development, enhanced learning potential 
and reduced nutritional disorders and contributed to the prevention of diet- related diseases. 
Community nutrition programmes were also developed for the region that promoted nutrition 
education and the consumption of under-utilized sources of vitamins and micronutrients. 
These measures helped to prevent and alleviate food deficiency disorders in 50% of cases by 
2030.  
 
Large scale regional irrigation plans have been implemented from 2018 on that addit ionally 
generate electricity for the processing of crop products. In addition to the large scale regional 
program, national small scale schemes of West African countries involving supplementary 
irrigation, rainwater harvesting or small reservoirs were also established and that brings the 
production close to market areas. The regional and national irrigation programs boosted the 
yield for the rainfed and inland valley systems by 2030 both for food staples and high-value 
export crops. A regional big airline, merging the small national companies, was created by 
ECOWAS in 2020 to ensure faster distribution of agricultural products and avoid losses. A 
regional railway funded by the African Development Bank and connecting costal countries 
(Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Togo) to landlocked countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Niger) helped shift road freight to rail. Port facilities were also improved in costal countries 
for exports outside the region. The ability to communicate, share and access data 
revolutionized by internet and hand phones adds to the possibility to seize the most profitable 
opportunities and to easily commercialize the products within the west African market and 
outside. 
 
Farming populations as a percentage of total populations fell steeply, from 80% to 35%, by 
2030 and that translated in population redistribution in growth poles between farming and 
non-farming activities as well between rural and urban areas. As a consequence notable 
changes in diets with the shift towards a higher consumption of imported cereals (wheat and 
rice) were observed in the region. Remittances of people who moved out of farming sector 
and out of rural areas back to their origins helped those who remain there to improve their 
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production systems, living conditions as well as their diet habits. Successful boosts of 
regional production led to food aid reduction as mostly appropriate irrigation schemes were 
set in place in response to erratic rainfalls in the drier parts of the region. In conjunction with 
the change in rural population, the consumption of meat rich in iron was increased in 
association with that of fruit thus enhancing iron absorption from cereal and meat based food 
sources. However, dietary changes (increased consumption of saturated and trans-fatty acids, 
sugars, and salt) combined with more sedentary lifestyles did cause increases in the 
prevalence of overweight and obesity. Food processing was conducted in a way that 
improved the bioavailability of nutrients both as community level activity and as a market-
oriented production to develop small and medium-scale enterprises.  
 
The ROPPA’s fight for food sovereignty prevented the states to sign economic partnerships 
with the EU but rather to help develop sustainable and modern family farming agriculture and 
agricultural businesses that have been productive and competitive both on intra-community 
and international markets. The regional integration of production and markets in one hand 
and in another the development of road systems and transportation infrastructures helped for 
a better distribution from poles of exceeding production areas (costal parts of the region) 
towards areas of low production potential for staple foods and vice versa for the meat. 
Indeed, the dry savanna proved more suitable for livestock production systems that also 
benefited from regional common agricultural and free trade policies. Livestock generally 
became less extensive under strict government regulations, but the intensification of 
production was also stimulated. In the quest for regional food sovereignty has had to grapple 
with strong global competition for a wide range of products. 
 
A regional food safety policy was developed and enforced going from the production (use of 
pesticide, animal drugs, etc.) to the food and feed chains to avoid the consumption of 
contaminated products. Pre-harvesting practices, harvesting, transportation and storage 
practices were improved and supported by good storage capacities both at individual and 
community levels. Micro-financing schemes helped in acquiring storage facilities together 
with processing infrastructures insuring the availability of the food products and keeping the 
prices at a reasonable level. All these measures resulted in a reduction by 50% by 2030 of 
food toxins (mycotoxin, aflatoxin, etc.) and food diseases from production and storage 
segments. As the street food sector in the urban economy is still important in 2030 and almost 
all individuals regardless of their age or socio-economic status consume foods outside, 
actions were taken to address the poor sanitary conditions under which street foods are often 
prepared and sold resulting in serious food contamination and food-borne illness. 
Municipalities devised training activities for all operators of the sector and facilitated the 
establishment of hygienic facilities as well as environmental conditions for this activity. As 
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women are very active in that sector, they constituted the large part of the beneficiaries 
leading to a significant increase of their income. That allows them to have better food and 
nutrition security for them and their children, better health and schooling for the children. 
 
Laws are established at the international level to recognize and reward the contribution of 
communities in the valuation of the organic or natural products. West Africa governments 
took measures to label foodstuffs containing GMOs, for the respect of farmers’ rights, 
populations’ food security and the environmental protection. Governments which decide to 
authorize GM products on their markets have developed a legal framework accordingly.  
 
Livelihoods and well-being: the slow rise of a supported middle class 
 
With rising GDP, average incomes in the region rose but because of this rise, equity 
decreased, following historic patterns seen in other regions. Still, boosted by a slow and late, 
but, by the 2020s, steady growth of education, economic development and increasing 
government support, the middle class in the region has grown from 34% of the population in 
2012 to 50% of the population in 2030. The growth of human and social capital associated 
with this growing middle class has in turn started to strengthen government and non-
government sectors. Consumption of domestic products in markets strongly guided by 
governments in the region increased with this rising middle class. As a consequence, 
household shares ownership increased by 20% by 2030 in national companies given them 
more voice. The need to diversify investments of the increasing middle-class was associated 
with a beginning of land grab by the new local rich forcing smallholders to sell their lands 
and become laborers, further adding to urbanization.  
 
New land tenure regulations were adopted in 2020 guaranteeing land property for farmers 
and as a consequence conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists were reduced to some 
degree. Health centers and schools were set up in more and more rural areas over the 2020s. 
25% of the rural households have access to internet by 2030. These communication tools 
helped farmers to be connected to market opportunities for crop products. As a consequence 
of better education and access to the information, farmer’s organizations that are conscious of 
gender balance emerged around each main product, with strong negotiation power. The rapid 
diffusion of technologies such as mobile phones and internet to low-income consumers has 
given these people a stronger political voice and demonstrated the potential to provide them 
with universal access to basic services. But strong political voices have led to repeated 
demonstrations in the 2010s and in the 2020s that generated a lot of destruction of public 
property and private belongings. The social instability associated with these demonstrations 
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slowed down some of the investments that were devoted to social and production sectors 
including health, education, agriculture and the environment. 
 
As local strong farmers’ organizations have emerged, they have been active at national and 
regional levels. Under the pressure of local farmers’ organization as well their regional 
representative which is the ROPPA, ECOWAS turned away from a European partnership 
negotiation in the early 2010 and focused on self-sufficiency instead. Such refusal gave more 
national and regional market opportunities to farmers and for their products.  
 
Reforms in education have gone slowly, because first, funds had to be made available for 
investment in education, and then, educators had to be trained. West African governments 
struggled with finding funds and developing mechanisms for effective implementation of 
education development. By 2030, however, illiteracy was beginning to be reduced 
significantly in the ECOWAS region. Many of those getting access to education were 
women. The education of women particularly led to better health standards for children and 
the elderly. 
 
A new land law was enacted which recognized the right for women to possess land and 
associated resources. Access to credit has also improved – government policies by 2030 
specifically focused on a gender balance in credit access.  
 
Health care workers became more widespread, and because of better education and working 
conditions there was less reason for those going into health care to emigrate. Child mortality 
dropped.  
 
The greater emergence and specialization of entrepreneurs, specifically women, in processing 
areas added value to local products and generated more profit for producers when the power 
of middle men was regulated by governments. Local farmers’ organizations grew in power 
and gave farmers better negotiation positions. 
 
National job promotion policies based on youth (men and women) and focusing on self-
employment were unsuccessful at first but once financial resources and government capacity 
grew in the 2020s, these were implemented with success leading to a parallel expansion of a 
real labor market for the region. By contrast, increased mechanization in agricultural 
production has reduced agricultural employment and further contributed to the shift of youth 
out of agriculture.  
 
Environments:  
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Conservation policies in West Africa took time to develop, since there were so many 
connected challenges (food security, education, political security, economic development) to 
tackle up to the 2020s. However, with growing education and economic welfare based on 
long-term policy strategies, attention to environmental governance grew in the 2020s. This 
was urgently needed – by the 2020s, development was increasingly affecting natural areas.  
 
Large projects such as the Great Green Wall, Regreening the Sahel picked up in the 2020s 
and contributed to plant cover and agriculture in rural areas. 
 
By the early 2030s, effects of conservation and protected area policies meant that rare species 
began to flourish again. Eco-tourism developed.  
 
A strong ECOWAS retracted the licenses of foreign countries such as Russia and China to 
fish in its territorial waters. Smaller fishermen were able to support themselves more and less 
encroachment into neighboring waters was needed. 
 
In spite of the regreening observed at present in the Sahel, many rural communities are still at 
the mercy of the floods caused by quicksands or dunes which threaten villages and even with 
urban areas. The World Bank’s efforts during early 2020s at conserving critical habitats and 
species in West Africa coastal areas have had success in their stated goals; however, this 
included the reestablishment of seasonal floods in the River Delta and many local populations 
were effected in the 2020s. Today, the region is less populated and residents have had to 
relocate, an expensive and upending process.  
 
In 2030, quality of watercourses in West Africa has significantly increased. The countries 
have established water sector strategies and reforms at national and transboundary levels. At 
national level, water sector reforms include: establishing new institutions to improve the 
coordination of water resources development and management and creation of a common 
approach for water laws; decentralization and devolvement of responsibilities to the lowest 
appropriate level; increase investment in the water sector infrastructure, etc. The harnessing 
of drinking water is now often located near production units, without requiring of expensive 
treatments. Privatization efforts and infrastructure improvements have increased the quantity 
and quality of the water system through the use of water meters, pump systems, and network 
densification. One of the first issues that had to be addressed was the low literacy rate, the 
improvement of which has made water management contracts and tools available to large 
segments of people who were previously unable to understand and articulate such 
transactions. However, the high water consumption required to make water service profitable 
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for the private sector in rural areas presents a problem of wasteful domestic use and risks to 
the environment stability and depletion of underground water resources.  
 
In 2030, a progress of afforestation is underway at the level of West African coast thanks to 
the programs of conservation and restoration of the mangrove swamp. After a period of 
decline, more than 165 protected marine areas were created offering to population a source of 
incomes with ecotourism, fishing and the oyster farming. 
In terms of air quality, once rapid assessment techniques were implemented through Air 
Quality Monitoring (AQM) plans, the ability to combat health effects, such as addressing 
higher rates of asthma in urban centers, greatly improved. By 2025, daily particulate matter 
measured in many West African Cities dropped below the World Health Organization 
guideline value for the first time since urbanization. The establishment of national emission 
standard regulations was an essential part of reversing this trend. The ban against importing 
cars older than five years has allowed the fleet used today to enjoy the benefits of improved 
technology.  
 
Civil Society to the Rescue? 
 
Figure A3  Main elements and relationships of the Civil Society to the Rescue? scenario. 
Socio-economic context: from turmoil to dynamic development 
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West Africa has seen a growing disparity between rather weak and passive governments and 
active, increasingly focused and powerful forces in both civil society and the private sector.  
 
Private sector companies within West Africa and from outside the region have become 
increasingly conscious of the value of long-term investments in the region – but these 
investments have primarily focused on large-scale agriculture, industry and services. Civil 
society, in the meantime, first flourished in a relatively uncoordinated way up to 2020 and 
then became increasingly organized and able to rally political support and influence 
government policies in the interests of rural development and social equality as well as 
environmental management.  
 
The period from 2012 to 2020 has also seen large economic and political instability in the 
region. In late 2011, the breakout of some identity-based conflicts (Tuareg rebellions), and of 
religious extremism (Boko Haram and AQIM) led to an influx of migrants and refugees at 
border areas, including those fleeing their countries because of wars and those who were sent 
back for peculiar reasons raised by States. This was followed with a second failure of Libya 
causing an influx of weapons and an economic crash in West Africa and, combined with the 
growing influence of extremist factions, has seen episodes similar to the coup in Mali 
threatening more countries in the region. This instability has further weakened governments 
and bolstered civil society, eventually leading to a manageable political stability. After the 
turmoil of decade leading up to 2020, both civil society organizations and private sector 
interests emerge with feasible and robust long-term goals.  
 
Civil society in particular has gained in power due to its ability to leverage the influence of 
global organizations and prevent negative impacts of outside military interventions to 
mitigate the conflicts in northern Mali and elsewhere.  
 
By 2030, private sector companies and powerful civil society actors are in a tense 
relationship while governments are a rather ineffective, unwilling tool in the eyes of both 
groups of actors.  
 
Tension between NGOs and governments before 2020 leads to the governments demanding 
audits. The need to compete between civil society organizations and private sector is there, 
but there is also a need to collaborate. As a result, each actor gets more information about 
other actors because of the need for transparency which on occasion leads to better 
collaboration. The greater effectiveness of the private sector and civil society shifts power to 
them and away from governments in a positive feedback loop.  
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After 2020, GDP increased gradually and still relatively slowly because of governments’ 
relative inability to foster investment and the aftershocks of political instability. Urbanisation 
is relatively slow in this last decade due to decentralization and provision of basic services in 
rural areas.  
 
Sectors where it has been most clear that governments are relatively weak are infrastructure 
planning – civil society organizations don’t have the power to invest in roads and similar big 
infrastructure. Developments in infrastructure sectors are dependent on only semi-
coordinated private investment. Similarly, there is relatively little change in the level of 
corruption and crime because governments remain ineffective on these topics. 
 
From 2030 to 2050: 
 
Food and nutrition security: a battle for all 
 
Private sector investments in big agriculture and civil society initiatives to increase regional 
food security clash but also strengthen each other. In 2015 there is pressure on farmers to 
become market oriented, leading to professionalization of farmers by 2020. By 2025, this 
leads to increased access to credit for small and medium size independent farmers, ultimately 
contributing strongly to yield increases and production of staple food in West Africa. 
Pressure from CSOs from around 2015 leads to better collaboration between researchers and 
farmers by 2020. By 2025, this leads to better technology adoption which results in more 
autonomous food production both at the level of communities and the region. The 
professionalization of farmers led to more compatibility with larger private sector interests. 
Livestock production and yields went op because of an increased demand for animal products 
due to rising incomes and urbanisation.  
 
In the years around 2020, NGOs and CSOs claimed - through hunger protests and statement 
to the governments of those countries - steps to reduce the impacts of malnutrition on the 
population. Part of the statement of CSOs in countries affected by food insecurity was: “We 
are exposing the lack of information on the situation of supply and demand for agricultural 
products, the lack of transparency on the markets, the sudden changes triggered by the 
situation of food insecurity in some countries”. They recommended that States adopt 
alternative measures to mitigate the volatility of food prices and new mechanisms to increase 
transparency and to manage the risks associated with new sources of market instability. 
 
Private sector development means that there has been a gradual expansion of cropland and 
numerous ranches were created. There is a strong increase of export in cash crops out of West 
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Africa by 2030 Agricultural expansion has led to the resurgence of land-based conflicts and 
conflicts between users of other natural resources. Commercial farming and smallholders 
fight over water supply in 2015. Also, limited access to resources for smallholder farmers 
means that by 2025, conflicts between smallholders erupt. Local CSOs put pressure on 
smallholders to assert their rights, backed by global donors. This causes conflict with an 
increasingly strong and politically dominant export oriented private sector which is interested 
in obtaining land from smallholders. As a result, smallholders in 2030 are still caught in a 
food fight between the private sector and other civil society groups. However, the assertion of 
rural communities’ rights has also led to an empowerment of women and their ability to own 
land and gain access to knowledge and resources. Increased international attention and 
funding of women’s right from 2015 puts pressure on gender issues from NGOs, CSOs on 
government and communities. As a result, by 2025, women’s ownership of land is increased. 
This has led to greater community food security in the region. 
 
By 2025, the private sector and civil society fight and collaborate over influence in shaping 
agricultural policies at national and regional levels. New policies for water infrastructure that 
emerge from earlier disputes are mildly successful and lead to some increase in access to 
water for farming and livestock, also contributing to autonomous regional production. 
Through increased opportunities for wage labour because of private sector investment and the 
struggle of CSOs to turn this investment into work, there is now more cash income and thus 
more money to buy food in 2030.  
 
During the 2010-2020 decade, civil society played a significant role in food security and 
agricultural development with an emphasis on access to social security and access to food as 
well as food exchange between secure and insecure regions. CSOs radicalized their struggle 
to draw the attention of producers on the hazards involved in access to GMOs. In 2030, rural 
professional organizations influence parliaments. Under pressure from non-state actors, laws 
and regulations are adopted at the state level to regulate the use of GMOs.  
 
From 2020 to 2030, the rate of population growth was high in the region, leading to increased 
competition for resources and food, followed by increased production of livestock ensuing 
from the boom of forage production. The increased availability of food resources to those 
living in urban areas increased nutrition security for those populations, while in the years up 
to 2030 nutrition security has increased primarily through increased access to knowledge of 
nutrition in rural areas. Unsold food surpluses are increasingly directed to the processing 
sector (for food and feed) and marketing after packaging generates more incomes for 
populations to invest. 
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Human well-being: empowered communities caught in the middle 
 
Abandoned by governments and limited by social stereotypes, rural communities and in 
particular the marginalized groups within them work to change their social status and to 
achieve better community representation. This leads to greater community self-organization 
and professionalism. Communities become more self-empowered. Women own more land. 
Also, by 2030, many farmers have become ICT-enabled “Techno-paysannes”. Increases in 
social and knowledge capital are driven by and driving the professionalization of farmers and 
technical know-how as well as women’s ownership of land. However, private sector interests 
function as both a pressure and a benefactor for rural communities, contributing to 
professionalism and community self-organization in the 2020s. Private sector investments are 
also heavily involved in land-grabbing, putting rural communities under pressure.  
 
In 2010-2015, organizations (NGOs, associations and CSOs) were fighting for the welfare of 
the poor in vulnerable rural communities amid regional turmoil. In the years up to 2020, 
across the world and especially in West Africa, gender equity became a topical issue in every 
social forum with support from NGOs and national and international CSOs and 
supranational, regional organizations that worked for the advancement of women and 
children. In several countries this pressure has led to legislation and policy documents being 
adopted to address issues related to gender. On this basis the rate of girls attending primary 
and secondary education increased in all countries by 2030. Also, by 2020, states were 
required to set up laws that provide key positions (parliamentarians, business leaders, 
government leaders, presidents of institutions) to women, though governments’ capacity to 
implement and enforce these laws has been rather weak. In terms of gender equality, there is 
effective law enforcement for the advancement of women; a redefinition of women's access 
to land and mechanisms are developed to enable women to combine family activities with 
employment. The number of women in paid non-farm employment is steadily rising because 
of these changes. Women's parliamentary representation (regional and state) has reached a 
very high level in most countries. Furthermore, urbanisation leads to more availability of 
education for women, as do investments by governments. Women’s literacy rate is ultimately 
high 2030 because of civil society involvement and provision of education services. Pressures 
on resources and a shifting gender balance in land ownership do cause strife at the 
community level. 
 
Furthermore, taking into account customs and habits led to an increase in the enrolment of 
children in primary schools. Many publications, debates and posters for public awareness 
were generated promoting national languages. Similarly, access for youth to secondary 
education registered noticeable progress in countries since early 2010. These allowed 
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children with no schooling to attend literacy programs. To refocus and begin the process of 
developing of the countries, new curricula were developed in schools and universities in the 
sub-region. The number and quality high schools and the lessons they provide lead to high 
success. Countering this, political instability resulted in an increase in the number of the 
unemployed, especially among young graduates and the situation of crisis in some states will 
weaken the labour market. In 2025, when political instability had calmed down, a better 
restructured knowledge production system, invested in by the private sector and guided by 
civil society demands, led to the creation of skilled employment in rural areas. Producers 
engaged in the private sector with the multiplication of ranches, poultry farms and gardens to 
meet food needs. There is an increase in the number of people/households working 8 hours a 
day for a salary that can pay for essentials for the household welfare.  
 
The civil and private sectors have been investing heavily in communication. For example, the 
mobile phone industry has grown increasingly important in the countries, allowing access by 
the majority of the population to mobile and internet services even in the most remote areas. 
 
In 2020, banks and other savings institutions are more interested in rural areas than was 
previously the case. Initiatives have been launched to encourage farmers to develop business 
initiatives and projects, with high amounts of money granted to invest in the production, 
processing and marketing of agricultural products. When financial resources were generated, 
the beneficiaries put their incomes in banks in the form of local savings. The insurance sector 
has in turn been increasing its attention to rural areas, providing insurance policies in case of 
diseases and other disasters that may occur among farmers. 
 
Civil society organizations have focused on the development of social capital by taking into 
consideration traditional structures and values in dialogues to prevent and reduce community 
conflicts. Through NGO/CSO pressure, populations have access to information on laws 
through special dissemination centres created for this purpose.  
 
While clashing in other sectors, CSOs and private companies in the health sector eventually 
work together to facilitate the recruitment of skilled health workers to raise the ratio of 
physicians/residents and village health centres. This has a moderate effect on the availability 
of health care - CSOs are not best equipped to deal with health care without government 
collaboration and the private sector is limited by its business models. Poverty goes down 
slowly. Malaria goes down slowly because the above, but easily deployable technology. 
Social protection schemes increase moderately under pressure from CSOs. 
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Environments: green hills and groundwater  
 
From 2012 to 2014, as population growth increases, the demand grew for energy sources 
(firewood, charcoal); so did the needs of rural populations for wood (building fences and 
shelters). This has led to excessive wood cutting. Also, this was accompanied by frequent 
bush fires that caused the reduction in the vegetation cover. Furthermore, livestock systems 
are expanded at the expense of natural land. NGOs gaining in power and pressuring 
governments from 2015 on has led to pro-forest policies and the rehabilitation of hills and a 
largely successful implementation of the Great Green Wall. Through both civil society and 
private sector support, environmental officers are trained and equipped to estimate the 
percentage of vegetation cover through GIS. It became possible to estimate the number of 
trees per area (measured from satellites). Large areas of land have been restored and a 
significant number of trees were planted. Community forests help eventually lead to 
integrated agriculture and agroforestry that helps return forest cover in many parts of the 
region. This in turn has a negative effect on livestock numbers by 2030. Replanting schemes 
and conservation efforts are countered by private sector-driven agricultural intensification 
and expansion that drives more logging. By 2020, also, private sector-driven expansion and 
intensification had led to increased pollution. Governments are finally driven to enforce 
regular inspections regarding compliance with environmental standards in 2030. On the 
whole, though, terrestrial biodiversity degradation was largely halted by 2030. In contrast, 
marine biodiversity continued to be degraded by fishery. 
 
For usage in various sectors, from 2010-2015, water was not available or insufficient to cover 
the needs of the overall population. When it is found, it is on the surfaces, rivers and very 
deep groundwater. At the rural areas, the access rate to drinking water was very low. In 
response to this, some methods and technologies had been developed by the private sector, as 
part of their broad push for development, for groundwater management for industry and 
consumption. For quality, following the improvement of some rural water supply networks, 
analytical laboratories were available to detect impurities in water before use and this has 
helped to reduce exposures of population to waterborne diseases. Indeed, a number of water 
meters were made available in urban and rural areas, thereby increasing the number of water 
points for individuals and households who now have their own taps for water supply. 
Because of this, the poverty index for quantity and quality water has improved gradually in 
cities and rural areas. However, the fact that private companies controlled so much of the 
water infrastructure that water availability for the poorest remained limited. 
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Save Yourself 
Figure A4 Main elements and relationships in the scenario “Save yourself”. 
Socio-economic context: an unstable new world 
 
 
 
 
 
West Africa has seen decades of economic and political turmoil by 2030. Though economic 
development has been strong through the activities of West African and international private 
companies in multiple sectors including commercial agriculture, this has not led to greater 
stability because of the inability of governments to harness this growth to resolve inequalities 
and poverty and mitigate tensions and conflicts. The extreme freedom offered to market 
forces in the region has led an increased regional GDP. It has also, however, led to the 
relative free reign of business cartels that have perverted potential benefits of this growth for 
vulnerable communities in the region. The private sector has operated in West Africa 
primarily out of interest in short-term gains and has therefore only marginally invested in 
infrastructure with West African governments. Government budgets have gone up and part of 
these new resources have been spent on infrastructure, but this has not been a priority.  
Illegal commerce through West Africa has also increased, including the rise of drug trade 
routes from Latin America to Europe – contributing to political instability and insecurity.  
The number of civil society and community-based organizations skyrocketed in response to 
relative passivity of governments and the very dynamic and forceful presence of private 
sector interests. This has led to mitigation of the worst consequences of the region’s chaotic 
dynamism in some cases and even to productive collaborations with the private sector in 
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sectors such as education. However, these civil society organizations have mainly been 
interested in their own short-term objectives and operated in a very chaotic fashion, 
especially up to 2025. More recently, CSOs have become more focused and organized, but 
the short-term perspective still dominates in 2030. 
The region’s corruption index has risen steeply and though attempts are made to control the 
most extreme cases, it is a self-sustaining cycle that neither governments nor non-state actors 
can break. Similarly, crime rates in the region increased steeply, and life is very unsafe with 
regional political instability being exacerbated by international drug cartels which has 
threatened to turn the most unstable West African states into all but narco-countries. There 
has been a high incidence of human trafficking through the most unstable countries (e.g. 
Mali) in the region.  
The emergence of more focused and influential civil society actors impacting the governance 
structure has brought about some promises of change to food security, livelihoods and 
environments in 2030. Although some new policies look like they will pay off, there is still 
endemic poverty with about 8 out of every 10 persons living below the poverty line in 
countries like Senegal, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Although poverty levels in Ghana have 
been decreasing there are still areas with poverty levels of above the national average of 
about 25 per cent. This is a consequence of the influence of private sector companies with 
short-term, self-directed interests in the determination of policies and the inability of policy 
makers to steer those interests toward public good.  
 
From 2030 to 2050: 
 
Food security: e-food machines and rural hunger 
 
In 2030, rural communities in most countries in West Africa are threatened with food 
insecurity due to the proliferation of commercial agricultural enterprises whose sole aim is 
producing for the international market. Whilst these commercial entities have created some 
job avenues for young people, their activities have denied a substantial proportion of local 
producers their sources of livelihood. Today, many indigenous farmers are experiencing 
lower yield levels compared to those levels in 2010 due to the move to highly marginal lands 
that are naturally prone to high rates of degradation and low productive capacity. The 
situation has worsened because of increasing drought events due to climate variability. There 
are improved varieties of cereals, legumes and root and tuber crops that have the potential of 
increasing food availability locally but require high input of fertilizers and associated inputs 
that are inaccessible to indigenous producers because of production costs which have gone up 
steeply with the rising costs of resources. Though region has seen no reformative change in 
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e.g. infrastructure some technology improvements have become available to commercial 
farmers.  
 
Due to low levels of production for local markets and strong trade liberalization policies of 
state governments, food imports are largely unrestricted. The government of Senegal passed a 
free trade and exchange law in 2021 which further increased the competition between local 
and imported products. Over 55000 containers of various food items from South Asia were 
imported through the Senegalese port alone in 2025. The quality of these food items cannot 
be guaranteed since there is not enough legislation to enforce food safety standards. The 
promotion of increased chemical fertilizer use and OGM varieties to meet was produced 
domestically. In northern Mali where, despite politically unstable conditions, the government 
leases the land to China Green Food Inc. (CGF) since 2020 food production has increased but 
the quality of food available to local communities has decreased as vegetables which comply 
with world quality standards are sold abroad in European market while the remaining food is 
sold locally. CGF is, by now, the top producer of vegetables sold in Europe. In Mali, 2018 
saw demonstrations in Tombouctou against the newly implanted Chinese industries which 
produce cheap vegetables and prevent farmers to sell their goods. But the demonstration was 
severely reprimanded by the police as the elected mayor had some share in the enterprise. 
 
The private sector naturally focuses on cash crops in terms of yield growth; private sector 
investment in yield growth has some moderate spillover effects for smallholders working in 
rainfed agriculture. In terms of irrigated crops, farmers themselves invested responding to 
rising prices, with no effective government support. Rainfed agriculture has continued to 
expand with population pressures, causing conflicts over land tenure across the region. 
Similarly, irrigated arable land expansion has initially continued, driven by the private sector. 
However, while the period up to 2020 sees a rapid increase in land expansion, but this 
increase stagnates as viable agricultural and pasture lands run out. Additionally, due to the 
increased pressure of growing populations on available food, important sources of domestic 
food from forests have been depleted. 
 
In contrast to the dismal state of rural food security, in urban environments there is an 
increase of available food and an increased dietary diversity because of a veritable invasion 
by food manufacturers in the region. A symbol of this change in available food diversity is 
the e-food machine, an ICT- supported food dispenser that has many instant foods and can be 
found anywhere in West Africa. There are some problems with this massive scale food 
processing and distribution, though: there have been instances of contaminated food that have 
wide momentary impacts on health and even cause some casualties in the region. In Ghana, 
Kumasi hospital statistics show that 20% of intoxication cases have been declared to have 
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cause by unsafe food while in Mali the number of intoxication cases caused by unsafe food is 
38%. Despite these scares, people in urban areas turn to massively produced, internationally-
run instant food more and more. The older generation still remembers in the 2010s where 
people used to sit on a table each evening to eat in family. Since then, longer work hours have 
meant that those who can afford it turn to the e-food machine. With a note of ¼ West African 
dollar one can buy lunch and a canned tomato juice. Increased meat consumption has 
generated problems with obesity in the urban centres. The ratio is less severe in Burkina and 
Niger where people do more exercise and use bicycles in cities. In Northern Ghana where 
German imported cows produce meat and milk in millions of tones, cholesterol levels are 
very high among the middle class. In the city of Tamale cholesterol is recorded to be at 
dangerous levels for many young people as well as elders. Civil society organizations emerge 
that address concerns about obesity. In Senegal for example the association “eating better” 
has demanded of the government that action should be taken more taxes on junk food sold in 
high schools. But the government plan never passed parliament due to the leaning on the 
votes by the private sector. Responding to the rising demand in livestock products, livestock 
numbers expand largely unregulated and rangeland expansion runs into conflict with arable 
land expansion. There is very little long-term investment in yield increase for livestock. The 
over-use of N fertilizer is mitigated by the introduction of a new N-fixing Maize which helps 
stop land degradation. This in turn leads to a significant drop of the maize prize. 
 
Livelihoods and wellbeing: divisions 
 
The percentage of population in poverty has decreased somewhat with the rising GDP of the 
region, though this increase has been less as some have expected because they 
underestimated the resilience of the disparity between different societal groups – and because 
the middle and upper classes have seen their incomes increase the equity in West African 
countries has actually decreased.  
 
West Africa has seen extremely high rates of migration to urban centres because of 
international companies coming in and stimulating labour in the cities. Additionally, land-
grapping has moved many from their homes and has had them looking for other opportunities 
in the cities. The rise of the international carbon price leads multinationals to aim for short-
term carbon markets in West Africa, leading to land conflicts between multinationals and 
smallholders. The livelihoods of most indigenous farmers who are still in rural areas have 
been in jeopardy because of the distortions created by such changes. Payments received from 
working on commercial farms are just enough for smallholders to pay for local staples whose 
prices have been increasing since 2010. Commercial entities have occasionally provided 
facilities like tap water, electricity and school infrastructure, to attract or keep the necessary 
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labour force for their enterprises. In most rural areas though, youth continue to leave because 
remunerations received are not enough. Rice cultivation in the so called now “quartier du bas 
fond” until 2019 used to be a profitable enterprise and major source of livelihood for an 
appreciable proportion of people living in Bamako, but has permanently ceased by 2030. 
 
Employment is very uncertain for wage labourers because employers can lay off as many as 
they want without any trouble. The law protects employers. Those who have a job have to 
work very hard as much as 12 hours per day in order to be able to make it. It is rare to find 
middle class individuals able to support families with only one job. Small strips of land 
surrounding Dakar belong to civil servants working as teachers in private schools and in 
similar positions. Employed youths work in factories. Those who suffer the most are women 
who usually do very difficult jobs and small jobs in farms or selling goods. Senegal and Mali 
are an exception, providing fairer conditions for women as, due to civil society pressure after 
2020, they were able to pass the “la loi sur la parité” which requires equality in the number of 
men and women in any elective position and similar rules for employment.  
 
In terms of social protection, there is a lot of activity from private sector social security 
schemes in collaboration with civil society organizations, to the benefit of the many who are 
eligible. However, there is exclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable who are not able to 
invest in such schemes. Access to healthcare has suffered amid the regional turmoil. Prices 
have been too high, and the poorest have mainly relied on street medicine of they could 
afford it. The pervasiveness of fake medicaments has had damaging consequences on the 
health of these vulnerable groups. There has been an increasing incidence of epidemics in the 
region, often environment-borne outbreaks. A lack of infrastructure and facilities to reach and 
treat sick has crippled efforts to mitigate these outbreaks, though despite this limitations 
CSOs and NGOs have been able to moderate some of the impacts in a patchy fashion. Private 
education is available but big funds are needed and short-term CSOs concentrate on primary 
education, not focusing on tertiary education. 
 
In terms of changes in the rate of literacy among women, the states have continued to do what 
they have done in the years leading up to 2012. Civil society organizations attempt to plug 
the holes, and there is some minor private sector involvement where it is deemed profitable to 
invest in women’s education. However, there is a measure of anarchy to these attempts. 
Women’s literacy rates remain highly linked to income.  
 
 
 
 
  92 
Environments: paying the price 
 
Deforestation over the last decades has occurred at very high rates – there have been huge 
pressures to expand other land types and even civil society has very little time for the 
conservation of natural environments with more pressing concerns grabbing public attention. 
Terrestrial biodiversity loss is somewhat hampered by a select group of active civil society 
organizations who protest fiercely against the loss of natural land. However, decline has been 
and continues to be the trend.  
 
Water availability for multiple uses continues to decrease across the sub-region. Most of the 
important rivers that used to provide multiple use service have been reduced in size. The 
reduction in size of these rivers has been attributed to both unsustainable exploitation and 
climate change effects. The building of 4 dams on River Niger Sokoto has changed its course 
and it no longer flows through Mali. Only two bridges serve as a remembrance of former 
Niger River in Mali. The pollution of the Niger River is a killer. Industry producing lead is 
polluting the river just outside Niamey, the former capital of Niger. The association for water 
quality has pressed charge against the German industry recycling atomic waste south of 
Kumasi. Additionally, increase in the activities of small mining groups has led to the 
pollution of important water bodies that supply water to urban towns and cities. This explains 
the problem that we experience in Bamako for water supply. In Ghana the River Densu which 
used to supply about 50 percent of the water requirement of Accra and its environs between 
2015 and 2020 is almost depleted, forcing local government authorities to turn their attention 
to the exploitation of underground water for both domestic and urban agriculture uses since 
2023. Today, over 6 percent of potable water comes from underground water sources.  
 
The liberalization of rice production in Senegal river valleys has been beneficial in terms of 
increases in productivity and production resulting a strong reduction in rice imports since 
2025. This has however reduced availability of water for both domestic and agriculture 
purposes to indigenous people through access restrictions and pollution. 
 
Increasing rural to urban migration has produced large urban slums with their associated 
sanitation problems. Urban water bodies continue to be polluted by both solid and liquid 
waste resulting in the ‘death’ of such rivers as Odaw in Accra. However, by 2030 a policy of 
the Government of Ghana to improve urban waste management through the building of 
infrastructure for waste conversion has paid off; over 150,000 tons of compost is being 
produced annually from organic waste since 2020.  
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Senegal has benefited financially through a private-sector oriented policy of liberating the 
rice production in its valley. 10% of the land around the river valley is exploited for food 
production by the French private company “Melon et fils”. This activity has, however, 
restricted and polluted the drinkable water.  
 
Expansion and population increases have put huge pressures on water availability for 
agriculture. However, governments and private sector work together mostly effectively to 
increase water availability. Access to water is being targeted by CSOs as well, because 
governments and the private sector do not focus on vulnerable rural communities. A 
technology for desalinizing sea water is being piloted in Ghana in 2030 which looks hopeful 
in its ability to increase water availability in most coastal towns and cities. Burkina still buy 
water from Niger from December to May and has intensified its cloud seeding experiment 
through private sector funds, the effects of which allow for enough water until November. In 
the meantime, marine biodiversity is strongly reduced because there are no attempts to 
mitigate fisheries and pollution.  
 
Intensified agriculture has led to degradation of the soil. The increasing use of marginal lands 
by rural communities has resulted in increased land degradation in almost all countries. 
Today in Ghana, the northern savannah zone has lost much its forest cover compared with 
2010.  
 
The increasing destruction of vegetative cover coupled with high rates of erosion has resulted 
in the siltation of rivers and streams rendering them seasonal. There is also increased 
occurrence of flush floods due to the reduction in carrying capacity of most streams and 
rivers. Soil degradation has converted to faster runoff which has further increased flooding. 
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Appendix C: Semi-Quantitative Indicators  
The tables below (1 to 4) provide semi-quantitative information about the developments of a number of indicators for economy and governance, 
food production and food security, livelihoods and environments for the four scenarios for Western Africa. In discussion with stakeholders, care 
was taken to specify the direction of change in each variable, and provide logic driving the change. Capturing the logic behind each change helps 
interpret further analyses using the scenarios as well as the quantitative model outputs.  
The consistency between indicators was also reviewed with the stakeholders while developing these assessments of directions of change.  
 
Table C1: Cash, Control, Calories Semi-Quantified Indicators 
 
Indicator 2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
Logic for change 2030-
2050 
Logic for change Volatility 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
++ = Initial boosts are not sustained as long-term growth + Periodical boosts and 
plateauing; reactive 
Highly volatile 
Women with 
higher education 
+ + urbanisation - schools/high education institutions 
nearby; more focus on primary education (school 
feeding programs); business schools 
+ trend continues high difference 
between years 
Yields for rainfed 
crops 
+ - more rainfed area expansion under low-input with 
lower concern for sustainability. Effects of land 
degradation, climate change, low intensification 
- Lack of long-term 
thinking, hard to repair 
once degraded 
Very high 
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Yields for 
irrigated crops 
+ + conservative estimate as yield gap lower in irrigated crops - Lack of long-term 
thinking, hard to repair 
once degraded 
Very high 
Area for rainfed 
arable land 
+++ +++ No concern or policies for informal expansion by 
governments 
++ Rural populations 
looking for lands 
because they are 
crowded out; leads to 
conflicts 
Highly volatile 
Area for 
irrigated arable 
land 
+ + Short-termism prevents heavy investment in irrigation 
infrastructure 
+ Same trend Slow 
Livestock 
numbers 
+ + Animal feed available (through irrigation) - increased 
demand (population growth/urbanization) 
- More focus on imports Unstable 
Livestock yield 
change 
+ + New breeds, new inputs but no structural investment = Veterinary services 
decrease 
Unstable 
Access to 
potable water 
+ + Government investment, focusing on a short-term 
issue; debate for privatization will be high 
= Failure of long-term 
insight into population 
growth 
Unstable 
Forest cover  --- -- population increases - cropland encroachment in 
rangelands and forest due to increased land demand - 
urbanisation - extension of land areas - deforestation 
(fuelwood); some funds from mitigation donors 
implemented 
- Interest from 
governments only with 
regard to climate 
adaptation on the 
short term 
Relatively slow 
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Farmer input 
prices 
++ + Some buffering, politically motivated by governments 
who need to stay in power, periodical 
++ Same as before Unstable  
Urbanization ++ ++ urbanization - state services provisions. States provide 
housing, motivated by political campaigns 
++ Highly urbanised, 
dependent on import 
 
Transportation 
infrastructure 
+ + Some fast investment into infrastructure for big rural 
development and food exchange between secure and 
insecure regions  
+ Low quality 
investment; local 
companies for the 
cheapest deal; 
Slow 
Dietary diversity + + Urban consumers will drive change; consume more that 
is not produced domestically; sugars, edible oils and 
fats 
+ Further openness of 
markets; diverse food 
with poor quality 
Unstable 
Reports of 
contaminated 
food/ food 
borne diseases; 
aflatoxins 
+ = Massive increases in livestock production; food cooked 
- increased use of chemicals in a controlled way; 
imported fish from Chinese fisheries; purchasing power 
is the problem 
= Trade liberalization 
continues but 
government regulation 
is also rather strict 
Unstable 
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Marine species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
-- -- Government action but very hard to implement, effects 
beyond national waters; in 20 years dwindling of fish 
stocks in the coastal areas; algal biofuel production on 
the continental shelf 
-- Trend of decrease 
continues 
Gradual 
Terrestrial 
species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
-- -- Overall decrease; some minor government control -- Trend of decrease 
continues 
Gradual 
water 
availability for 
agriculture 
- - Increased technology support for increasing water 
efficiency but very high pressures on water availability 
(population, industrialization) - states compete for 
consumption 
= Very unstable water 
availability - short-term 
remedies 
Unstable 
Existence of 
social protection 
schemes; 
percent 
population 
covered 
+ + Makeshift policies, unreliable = Each new government 
brings in new plans to 
get voters - but no 
consistency - mostly 
concerned with urban 
work force, little 
attention to rural social 
protection 
Unstable 
Number of 
community 
based 
organizations 
+ + moderated by government - decentralization + 
community organizations 
= Number will be the 
same; number of active 
CSOs will decrease; 
government pushes for 
federation 
Unstable, follows 
political change 
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Crime rates + + Short-term focused government will crack down on 
crime; but cannot deal with structural issues 
= Reactive policies to get 
rid of problems of that 
day - but new problems 
emerge constantly; 
unemployment 
Very volatile 
Corruption index + + International crime, funding for equitable development 
redirected to other areas; big money to be made in big 
deals 
+ The trend of previous 
decades continues; 
culture of selfish 
business 
Unstable 
 Access to health 
care 
= + Government and private sector investments are limited, 
knowledge capacity limited, slow, quality questionable 
+ Trend continues; 
population overwhelms 
available health care; 
capacity to deal with 
some emergencies 
does exist; 
governments can 
leverage donor funds 
well. 
Unstable 
Prevalence of 
malaria 
+ + Shame related to disease - sanitation issues due to 
increasing population 
+ Governments are able 
to cure but not prevent 
Pervasive 
Percent 
population in 
poverty 
- - Government action on poverty driven by politics, but no 
structural investments 
- Will keep decreasing 
slightly driven by 
momentary action 
Poverty peaks and 
falls regularly 
Equity - - rising GDP, following historic trends - not too much because 
of government work on 
worst poverty 
Unstable 
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Table C2: Self-Determination Semi-Quantified Indicators 
 
Indicator 2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
Logic for change 2030-
2050 
Logic for change Volatility 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
+ + Some countries already involved in long-
term transformation. Others will have to 
make an effort. Minerals exported/divide 
between countries, artificial way of changing 
GDP through services 
++ Transition into services 
and secondary industry, 
agricultural production; 
processing 
Volatility decreases 
Women with 
higher 
education 
+ + Time lag in education; focus on vocational 
education 
++ This generation reaps the 
benefits of earlier 
investment in education 
Slow variable 
Yields for 
rainfed crops 
+ + Capital investment takes time; Strong 
government will but few resources; market 
signals drive yield investments supported by 
governments. Backup irrigation systems 
implemented. 
++ After period of trial and 
error, institutions are now 
strong enough, and 
capacitated enough to 
cause real improvements; 
governments are investing 
in research and 
development 
Variability decreases 
somewhat 
Yields for 
irrigated crops 
+ + Water a limiting factor but may be available 
at a continental level; technology a limited 
factor; new tech needs strong organization; 
better management; cultivars; hybrids; 
better water management; two crops per 
year 
++ Once irrigation schemes 
are widely implemented, 
yields can increase 
strongly 
Medium instability 
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Area for 
rainfed arable 
land 
++ ++ Growing population but land use planning 
for sustainable management starts to 
become effective 
+ Effective land use 
management policies; 
higher yields 
Slow variable 
Area for 
irrigated 
arable land 
++ ++ Planning mitigates increase; regulated water 
pricing; sustainable water use; medium-sized 
farms with government support 
+++ Once institutional capacity 
and political will is there, 
small irrigation schemes 
are easy to apply widely; 
sensitized by climate 
change concerns 
Slow variable 
Livestock 
numbers 
++ ++ Responds to demand and government 
planning 
++ Demand continues and 
government support 
remains 
Unstable as much as 
affected by inputs  
Livestock yield 
change 
++ ++ Government planning to support yield 
increase 
++ Trend continues Affected by inputs  
Access to 
potable water 
+ ++ Access for whom? Government willingness, 
but limiting factors are technology, pollution 
++ Investment in 
infrastructure; pressure 
from population; pollution 
by irrigated agriculture; 
climate change 
Relatively unstable 
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Forest cover  -- -- Government mitigates some deforestation 
but overall huge pressures on forests; 
Increase energy prices; some climate change 
effects 
- Policies focusing on 
replanting schemes as 
incentives for 
smallholders and medium 
cash agriculture in 
marginalized area; green 
economy; incentives from 
carbon business 
(secondary benefits) and 
ecosystem services 
Relatively slow 
Farmer input 
prices 
+ + Fossil fuel prices increase, but government 
organizing price drops for fertilizer, seeds, 
subsidies, manpower 
+ Trend continues, but 
dampened by big and 
smaller renewable energy 
projects in the Sahel 
Relatively unstable 
Urbanization ++ ++ Smaller towns or big cities? Peri-urban 
agriculture; food policies to support rural 
areas - consequences of government action 
rather than government control, land tenure 
++ Follows previous trend Unstable because of 
short-term work 
migration 
Transportation 
infrastructure 
+ + Pressure to invest in infrastructure but 
democratization process means that this will 
take time; limited resources; more recurrent 
costs for maintenance; world bank loans; 
hydro-power leading to conflicts of interest; 
costs for cross-boundary security and 
customs 
+++ This period reaps the 
benefits of previous 
investments 
Slow variable 
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Dietary 
diversity 
++ ++ Urbanization will drive increase of dietary 
diversity – further driven by proactive 
government policies 
+++ Markets and policy driver 
further diversity, but rural 
areas affected by food 
insecurity through climate 
change 
Unstable 
Reports of 
contaminated 
food/ food 
borne 
diseases; 
aflatoxins 
+ + Massive increases in livestock production; 
food cooked - increased use of chemicals in a 
controlled way; imported fish from Chinese 
fisheries; purchasing power is the problem 
- Capacities are built; 
animal numbers are 
reduced; improvement of 
veterinary services; less 
overuse of drugs; less 
chemical residues; more 
regulations 
 
Marine 
species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
-- -- Government action but very hard to 
implement, effects beyond national waters; 
in 20 years dwindling of fish stocks in the 
coastal areas; algal biofuel production on the 
continental shelf 
- Policing and monitoring of 
marine resource uses 
becomes easier through 
technologies 
 
Terrestrial 
species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
-- - Decrease slowed down -   
water 
availability for 
agriculture 
+ + Increased technology support for increasing 
water efficiency but also increasing 
competition from other sectors 
+ Government capacity 
increases but challenges 
also increase 
Moderately 
unstable; partly 
buffered 
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Existence of 
social 
protection 
schemes; 
percent 
population 
covered 
+ ++ Proactive policies ++  Some instability 
with regard to how 
this is executed 
Number of 
community 
based 
organizations 
+ + no need for strong growth in civil society 
because of stronger government 
+   
Crime rates ++ ++ International crime, resourcing of funding to 
other areas 
+ Up with increasing 
population; economic 
activity, conflicts 
 
Corruption 
index 
+ + The struggle for institutional change opens 
up new opportunities for corruption; 
increasing wealth 
- Corruption goes down 
with increasing equity 
Slow variable 
 Access to 
health care 
+ + Slow improvement through government 
policies 
++ Institutional, knowledge 
and technical capacity 
have developed 
Stable 
Prevalence of 
malaria 
+ + No change at first -- Vaccine supported by 
government policy; 
education; better water 
infrastructure; sanitation 
 
Percent 
population in 
poverty 
- - Slow to decrease - policy change takes time -- Reaps benefits from 
earlier changes 
Relatively stable 
Equity + + First equity will decrease as certain groups 
are lifted out of poverty and other remain 
- Better distribution of 
wealth through policies, 
taxes 
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Table C3: Civil Society to the Rescue? Semi-Quantified Indicators 
 
Indicator 2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
Logic for change 2030-
2050 
Logic for change Volatility 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
+ + Increasing regional stability and strong 
civil societies stimulate investment, 
but governments are not able to 
facilitate investments well.  
+ Population pressures increase; 
puts a pressure on education; 
without governments it is 
difficult to bridge the growing 
gap between poor, middle class 
and rich. Climate change makes 
things worse for the poorest.  
Fairly high because of 
absence of effective 
government policies; 
climate change, 
challenges with 
population growth. 
Women with 
higher 
education 
+ + Those who can afford some cheap 
education are well supported ; the 
very poorest miss out 
+ Increases but challenged by 
increased population 
Smooth development 
Yields for 
rainfed crops 
+ + The professionalization of farmers 
supported by social enterprises and 
CSO is combined with more effective 
communication tech ; though 
benefitting largely those who already 
have some capacity for yield increase 
++ Adoption of new strategies 
through comms, agricultural 
technology etc. Big multinational 
GMO - two responses: 1. 
resistance and alternative 
farming; 2. "home-grown" 
responsible GMO technologies. 
Volatile because of 
economic inputs and 
climate change 
Yields for 
irrigated crops 
+ + Conservative estimate as yield gap 
lower in irrigated crops 
+ same assumption as for rainfed; 
small schemes can be set up by 
private sector, but no big 
government investment in 
irrigation 
same assumption as 
for rainfed 
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Area for rainfed 
arable land 
+ ++ Increase in demand drives expansion; 
desire for livelihood improvement  
+ Two drivers: 1. population and 
increased demand; 2. 
intensification through 
technology availability and 
dissemination decreases pressure 
on land expansion 
Slow 
Area for 
irrigated arable 
land 
+ + Expansion of commercial agriculture ++ Same as above; but some rainfed 
land converted to irrigated land 
Slow 
Livestock 
numbers 
+ + increased demand of animal products 
(focus on quality rather than quantity) 
+ Assumptions continue; more 
demand for meat, better 
intensification; global 
competition for production of 
livestock products 
Relatively volatile 
Livestock yield 
change 
+ ++ Demand for meat drives private sector 
investment. Social entrepreneurs work 
with professionalized communities. 
++ Trend continues as before – 
demand grows. 
Unstable 
Access to 
potable water 
- + Private and civil society intervention 
and collaboration 
+ Technology increases, but 
population pressures and CC 
impacts also increase 
Volatile because of 
climate change and 
private sector 
activities 
Forest cover  - ++ more mechanisms for protection and 
replanting of forests, intensification of 
agroforestry practices on both small-
scale and large-scale land ownership 
++ In the absence of strong 
pressures on land, reforestation 
continues, supported by 
agroforestry and new 
technologies 
Slow 
  106 
Farmer input 
prices 
+ + Rising input prices are unmediated  + Fuel prices increase; technology 
has a cost; but renewable 
technologies become more and 
more available 
Very volatile because 
of global prices 
Urbanization + + long term perspective - civil society 
and private sector involved in 
development priorities, provisions of 
basic services - decentralisation and 
responsibilities at local level; but also 
large-scale agriculture in some places 
that excludes vulnerable rural 
populations and drives some 
urbanization 
++ Population pressures increase 
beyond the capacity of the rural 
areas to absorb it - this means a 
relative increase in urbanization; 
additionally, urban centres will 
expand into rural areas. 
Agriculture in peri-urban areas 
will expand. 
An increase in short-
term travel between 
urban and rural areas. 
Transportation 
infrastructure 
+ + Civil society and private sector actors 
don't have the means and power to 
invest in roads beyond targeted 
investment; governments make some 
investments 
- Lack of effective government 
support means that 
infrastructure is degrading 
generally; exceptions are made 
when there is specific private 
sector interest in developing 
roads etc. 
Slow variable 
Dietary 
diversity 
+ + increased sources of food in urban, 
increased awareness for nutritious 
value in rural 
++ Education, literacy of women, 
technology will greatly increase 
dietary diversity 
Because of disasters, 
poor roads etc. 
dietary diversity is 
volatile 
Reports of 
contaminated 
food/ food 
borne diseases; 
aflatoxins 
= - Better policy to some degree but also 
more activity 
- Better technology but even more 
activity in terms of production, 
processing, distribution etc.  
Outbreaks 
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Marine species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
-- -- No substantial policy on marine 
biodiversity 
-- Trend continues Steady decline 
Terrestrial 
species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
-- -- Relative preservation of habitats due 
to controlled deforestation 
- Lack of land pressure and 
increased reforestation 
Steady decline 
water 
availability for 
agriculture 
= = Water harvesting and other SLWM 
technologies and irrigation 
compensate for cropland expansion; 
but little overarching policy 
- Population pressure, uncertain 
climate change, mitigated by 
more effective water use 
technologies 
Unstable 
Existence of 
social 
protection 
schemes; 
percent 
population 
covered 
+ ++ Civil society and private sector push 
government; but government is weak 
+ Earlier protection schemes have 
failed because of lack of 
government support; donor 
fatigue 
Unstable 
Number of 
community 
based 
organizations 
+++ +++ Lack of government drives civil society ++ Organization and federation of 
civil society 
Unstable to more 
stable 
Crime rates = = Crime is not dealt with by 
governments 
+ Private security does not help Unstable 
Corruption 
index 
= = No real change – governments do not 
possess the capacity to deal with 
corruption issues.  
+ Government does nothing and 
corruption flourishes though civil 
society watchdogs moderate 
Unstable 
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 Access to 
health care 
= + CSOs not best equipped to deploy 
health care infrastructure; private 
sector invests but not available for the 
poorest 
+ Technology increases health care 
for middle and upper classes, but 
not for poorest - tech still costs 
money 
Relatively unstable; 
depends on markets 
Prevalence of 
malaria 
- - easily deployable technology by CSOs 
(impregnated mosquito nets etc.) 
--- Vaccine available - but not for 
everybody 
Steep decline when 
vaccine is introduced 
Percent 
population in 
poverty 
= - Social enterprises and civil society 
programs lift some out of poverty 
+ More population - more ok, more 
poor 
Unstable for middle 
classes and relatively 
less poor, but stable 
for the poorest  
Equity - - Equity decreases with increasing GDP 
and no government control 
- Trend continues Unstable 
       
Table C4: Save yourself Semi-Quantified Indicators 
Driver 2010-
2020 
2020-
2030 
Logic for change 2030-
2050 
Logic for change Volatility 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
++ ++ Open market competition with 
little state interference, but also 
forming of cartels, society overall 
is worse off 
++ Dynamic growth continues to 
build though resources have 
become a constraint; large 
informal economies 
No control of the 
situation - volatility 
increases and affects 
political stability - only 
the strong benefit 
Women with 
higher education 
= + Private education available, big 
funds needed, short-term CSOs 
do not focus on tertiary 
education. 
+ Inequality in education increases Slow variable 
Yields for rainfed 
crops 
+ + Private sector will focus on cash 
crops; farmers lobby for food 
production; private sector some 
investment but not significant 
+ increases only for those rainfed 
crops that are economically 
viable on a large scale like 
biofuels; staple foods suffer 
Unstable because of 
climate change and 
input prices 
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Yields for irrigated 
crops 
+ + Private sector focus on cash 
crops; farmers lobby to improve 
food production 
+ Increases only for those rainfed 
crops that are economically 
viable on a large scale (e.g. 
biofuels); staple foods suffer 
Unstable because of 
climate change and 
input prices 
Area for rainfed 
arable land 
++ +++ No mitigation of population-led 
pressure, conflicts ensue over 
land  
= All easy land expansion has 
happened by now;  
Slow variable 
Area for irrigated 
arable land 
++ = Price to pay, waste, pollution; 
depleting water; no government 
support for infrastructure; rapid 
increase but taildives as depletion 
happens 
+ Irrigation expansion will happen 
only in areas that are already 
suitable to be converted 
Slow variable 
Livestock numbers ++ + No government mitigation, 
population pressure; conflict with 
increasing arable land 
= No more room for expansion of 
numbers 
Relatively unstable 
Livestock yield 
change 
= = Very patchy investment, no 
government planning; no 
veterinary control; current trend= 
decrease 
= No improvement unstable 
Access to potable 
water 
= + Some investment when profits 
can be made 
+ Water is available when 
profitable 
Unstable 
Forest cover  --- --- Huge pressures and no 
mitigation, only slightly by NGOs 
--- Continuing decline Slow variable 
Farmer input 
prices 
+++ +++ No reformative change, some 
tech improvements 
+++ Continues to follow global prices Unstable 
Urbanization +++ +++ International companies coming 
in, stimulating labour in the cities, 
land-grabbing 
+++ This trend will continue Unstable due to short-
term migrations  
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Transportation 
infrastructure 
+ = Private sector comes in for 
current gains; some government 
investment in infrastructure 
initially through private sector 
influence 
= With new hyper-flexible 
transport tech formal 
infrastructure is no longer 
necessary 
Slow variable 
Dietary diversity ++ ++ Invasion by the food 
manufacturers - e-food machine 
in urban areas; low diversity in 
rural areas 
++ Synthetic meat - mostly focusing 
on urban diets; rural areas still 
lag behind  
Unstable 
Reports of 
contaminated 
food/ food borne 
diseases; aflatoxins 
+++ +++ Problems are not balanced or 
mitigated 
+++ Some control by new medical 
tech, but also much more activity 
Crises 
Marine species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
--- --- Not mitigated by policies --- The trend continues Slow variable 
Terrestrial species 
biodiversity 
indicator 
-- -- Forest cover reduced; somewhat 
mitigated by NGOs 
-- More NGO focus but not very 
successful 
Slow variable 
water availability 
for agriculture 
--- --- Huge pressures on water 
availability  
--- Infrastructure degraded; climate 
change; rising demand 
Unstable 
Existence of social 
protection 
schemes; percent 
population 
covered 
-- -- Private sector social security 
schemes increases, but exclusion 
as well. Government social 
schemes decrease 
0 Civil society puts pressure on 
private sector through 
government 
Unreliable 
Number of 
community based 
organizations 
+++ +++ Out of necessity, state is not 
there, chaotic 
- The best organized NGOs/CSOs 
will survive and become more 
powerful 
Unstable but 
increasingly stable as 
survivors emerge 
Crime rates +++ +++ Corruption spreads with no 
policies to stop it; cartels control 
governments 
+++ No change in the trend this time 
period 
Unstable 
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Corruption index +++ +++ international drug crime cartels 
(narco-countries?); human 
trafficking through unstable 
countries 
++ Organized crime nations, links 
between formal and 
underground private sector 
Pervasive 
 Access to health 
care 
- - Prices too high, street medicine, 
fake medicaments 
- New technologies available but 
these do not reach the majority 
Unstable 
Prevalence of 
malaria 
++ ++ Moderated by non-state, 
environment-borne diseases, lack 
of infrastructure/facilities to 
reach sick 
++ Civil society slightly better at 
dealing with outbreaks but 
largely continues 
Seasonal 
Percent population 
in poverty 
- - Poverty is reduced as GDP grows 
and provides some income 
through secondary effects and 
informal economies; enclaves of 
poverty persist 
- Gap between rich and poor will 
increase; mechanisation will 
increase unemployment 
Unstable 
Equity --- --- Large differences between 
incomes 
--- See above Unstable 
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Appendix D: Categorization of Western Africa within the SSP 
drivers 
Table D1: Fertility grouping (Kc & Lutz, 2014) 
Benin High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Burkina Faso High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Côte d’Ivoire High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Gambia High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Ghana High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Guinea High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Guinea-Bissau High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Liberia High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Mali High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Niger High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Nigeria High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Senegal High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Sierra Leone High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Togo High fertility countries (TFR > 2.9) 
Cape Verde Low fertility countries (TFR ≤ 2.9) 
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Table D2: World Bank Definition of income groupings 
(http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups) 
Country 2000 2010 
Benin L L 
Burkina Faso L L 
Gambia, The L L 
Guinea L L 
Guinea-Bissau L L 
Liberia L L 
Mali L L 
Niger L L 
Sierra Leone L L 
Togo L L 
Cabo Verde LM LM 
Côte d'Ivoire L LM 
Ghana L LM 
Nigeria L LM 
Senegal L LM 
Table D3: SSP drivers not explicitly included in the narrative or storyline of CGIAR 
scenarios 
carbon intensity  
energy intensity  
energy tech change 
fossil constraints 
technology development 
technology transfer 
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Appendix E: Area and Yield growth by crop and scenario 
Figure E1  Millet average annual growth in production from FAO statistics (FAOSTAT, 
2015) and CCAFS scenarios from 2010-2050 the growth in production is allocated to 
either expansion of area or improvement in yields  
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Figure E2  Sorghum average annual growth in production from FAO statistics (FAOSTAT, 
2015) and CCAFS scenarios from 2010-2050 the growth in production is allocated to 
either expansion of area or improvement in yields  
 
Figure E3  Maize average annual growth in production from FAO statistics (FAOSTAT, 
2015) and CCAFS scenarios from 2010-2050 the growth in production is allocated to 
either expansion of area or improvement in yields  
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Figure E4  Cassava average annual growth in production from FAO statistics (FAOSTAT, 
2015) and CCAFS scenarios from 2010-2050 the growth in production is allocated to 
either expansion of area or improvement in yields  
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